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Abstract
The continuous technological progress and the constant growing of information flow
we observe every day brought us an urgent need to find a way to defend our data
from malicious intruders; cryptography is the field of computer science that deals
with security and studies techniques to protect communications from third parties,
but in the recent years there has been a crisis in proving the security of cryptographic
protocols, due to the exponential increase in the complexity of modeling proofs.
In this scenario we study interactions in a typed λ-calculus properly defined to
fit well into the key aspects of a cryptographic proof: interaction, complexity and
probability. This calculus, RSLR, is an extension of Hofmann’s SLR for probabilistic
polynomial time computations and it is perfect to model cryptographic primitives
and adversaries. In particular, we characterize notions of context equivalence and
context metrics, when defined on linear contexts, by way of traces, making proofs
easier. Furthermore we show how to use this techniqe to obtain a proof methodology
for computational indistinguishability, a key notion in modern cryptography; finally
we give some motivating examples of concrete cryptographic schemes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nowadays we live in a world in which we observe a continuous increase of information
flowing around us; indeed today we can find a PC in every house, and there often
happens that all members of the family own their personal laptops; furthermore the
use of smartphones allows us to remain connected to the web everywhere and every
time we want. Technological progress allows us to do lots of activities simply by
connecting to the web; by using our PC or smartphone we can get information, talk
with friends, connect ourself to other servers, make financial transactions, do home
banking and so on.
Unfortunately, such a great abundance of possibilities has negative consequences,
indeed the more we send information through the network, the more we show vulner-
abilities to potential malicious agents. Much of the information that runs through
the web are quite considerable, such as identities, passwords, financial transactions,
positions and so on; a contingent theft of information might have very bad conse-
quences, so the question that rises is: “How can we protect our personal data from
intruders?”. There will always be the possibility to avoid to do these considerable
activities, but that’s not what we are looking for; our purpose is to obtain secure
methods that we can trust, in order to do all our activities safely.
1
1.1. CRYPTOGRAPHY: THE INSTRUMENT TO MAKE
COMMUNICATIONS SECURE
1.1 Cryptography: the instrument to make com-
munications secure
Cryptography is the field of computer science which deals with security and studies
techniques to guarantee secure communications in presence of third parties and then,
it is the instrument we use to achieve our purpose. The main goal of cryptography is
to allow a secure communication between two or more participants over an insecure
channel; the security of a communication is defined depending on what we want to
ensure about the information we want to protect: secrecy, integrity, authentication,
non-repudiation, privacy and so on. This goal is achieved by using the so called
cryptographic algorithms and protocols.
Cryptographic algorithms and cryptographic protocols are sequences of instruc-
tions for one or more participants; these instructions have to be performed sequen-
tially, a new step starts if and only if the previous one is concluded and obviously
the instructions of a protocol should not be ambiguous. For example, a protocol
that guarantees the secrecy of a confidential information is usually defined by giving
a triple pGEN,ENC,DECq where GEN,ENC,DEC are cryptographic algorithms such
that:
• GEN is used to generate the keys that will be used by the other two algorithms
to protect information.
• ENC is used to encrypt the confidential information by using the keys generated
by GEN so that they become unaccessible for a potential intruder which is not
in possession of the keys. These kind of algorithms take in input a key (the
encryption key) and a message and return a cyphertext.
• DEC is the algorithm used to decrypt the cyphertext generated by using the
encryption algorithm. These algorithms take in input a cyphertext and a key
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COMMUNICATIONS SECURE
(the decryption key) and return a plaintext.
The algorithms of a protocol, such as GEN,ENC,DEC, are called cryptographic prim-
itives ; if the encryption key is the same as the decryption key we call the algorithm
symmetric, otherwise asymmetric.
The continuous need for security guarantees we were talking about previously led
to a significant increase in the complexity of cryptographic protocols design; but how
can we say that a protocol satisfies the security property we are interested in? How
can we say that a protocol is secure? A common way used long ago was to propose
a new cryptographic scheme to the community and wait for some vulnerabilities to
be found. If someone found a potential attack to the scheme, the same had to be
corrected and reanalyzed; if none was able to find errors in the scheme it could be
developed and certified as secure.
Nowadays such a way of certification can’t be considered trustworthy; indeed,
we have lots of examples of cryptographic protocols which have been broken after
several years (For instance the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem was broken after 10 years).
So, what we really need is a way to analyze the cryptanalysis itself in addition to
the protocol; we need the security proof to be certifiable, we need for each protocol
a mathematical proof that all the possible adversaries are not able to break it.
The analysis of a cryptographic protocol can be done by two different points of
view: formal and computational. The formal point of view, also called the Dolev-
Yao model [20], assumes the perfect security of the primitives which are used in
the protocol, so every primitive is seen as a blackbox which works only if the agent
owns the required information. Messages and keys are seen as atomic elements
that can be combined during the protocol, so the purpose of a formal analysis is to
study the protocol and find all the possible bugs that could advantage a malicious
intruder. The computational way, on the other hand, sees primitives as functions
from bitstrings to bitstrings and also messages and keys are seen as concatenations
or lists of bits; so the analysis of a protocol from the computational point of view
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may result more correct, due to the fact that we don’t impose any condition on the
primitives, but in practice more complex and error prone.
The complexity of the computational analysis makes the study of an entire pro-
tocol really difficult; the cryptographers use to analyze protocols from the formal
point of view, whereas they prefer to use the computational point of view to analyze
primitives. An attempt to bridge the gap between these two different approaches
has been proposed by Abadi and Rogaway in 2000 [2]; their work is a first step
towards a reconciliation of the computational and the formal analysis in which it is
provided a computational justification for a formal treatment of an encryption. The
idea is that, under some assumption on the formal expression and on the primitives
used by an encryption scheme, it is possible to prove that the formal equivalence of
two expressions corresponds to computational indistinguishability and so a formal
proof is computationally sound. The difficulty in using this approach is that the
assumptions needed on the primitives of the encryption scheme are not trivial.
In this thesis we will focus our attention on the computational analysis.
1.2 The structure of security proofs
One of the most used methods to build a security proof from the computational
point of view can be described by four steps:
1. Define the security property we are going to prove.
2. Define a realistic model of a potential adversary.
3. Present the cryptographic protocol we are going to study.
4. Reduce the security property of the protocol to a particular assumption.
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This list of actions lead us to the setting of our proof, indeed our path will be
directed to prove the following statement: “If there exists an adversary which can
break the cryptosystem, then the same adversary is able to break the assumption with
little expedients”.
For example we choose secrecy as the security property we want to obtain from a
cryptographic scheme and we define the adversary as a probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm (this is the most common definition); then we opt for the RSA protocol
and we try to reduce the secrecy property of the RSA protocol to a particular well-
known assumption, in this case the factorization of a large integers. It is possible to
prove that if there exists a PPT algorithm A that can decrypt a message encrypted
by the RSA protocol then the same algorithm can be used efficiently to build a PPT
algorithm A1 that factorize large integers; but, since we know that factorization is a
hard problem, the consequence is that the algorithm A can’t exists and so the RSA
protocol is secure from the secrecy point of view.
This proof is called by reduction and by this way we can establish that if the
assumption holds we have that the cryptosystem under control is secure, i.e. the
security property is proved. One of the most common ways to prove a security prop-
erty of a scheme by reduction is to use the game-based proof; such demonstrations
are buildt as a sequence of games or experiments G0,G1, ...,Gn. We will discuss
about it in Chapter 2.
In [13] Bellare and Rogaway express a concept clear and free from doubt: “Many
proofs in cryptography have become essentially unverifiable. Our field may be ap-
proaching a crisis of rigor”. As we said previously, with the passing of time, we notice
that cryptographic protocols have become more complex and it often happens that
the security proofs given by hand are error-prone, so we need new instruments to
face this situation. Unfortunately, we assist to a scenario in which the cryptog-
raphers community has not chosen a common path to expand; actually, we could
say that at the moment the cryptographers research is growing horizontally, that is
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proposing always different methods and approaches to this crisis of rigor in proving
cryptoschemes. We will observe some of these approaches, in Chapter 2.
As we said previously, a proof structured as a game sequence is one of the most
used standard to guarantee the security property of cryptographic constructions,
so we decided to remain on this path and to examine in depth the framework of
a game-based proof. A critical point in a game-based proof is the choice of the
calculus used to model the whole system, indeed we are looking for a language that
allows us to describe cryptographic primitives but also to model all the possible and
feasible adversaries that try to break the cryptosystem.
When we deal with cryptography there are three fundamental aspects that we
have to take into account:
• Interaction.
• Complexity.
• Probability.
Interaction is a key aspect, an adversary must be able to interact with the
cryptographic protocol: he must have the possibility to pass arguments (messages,
keys and so on) and to observe all the output of the primitives used; this is formalized
by saying that the adversary has the complete control of the network and it is
necessary to simulate a realistic scene, where we are not able to guarantee the
security of the channel used for communications.
Complexity is another key aspect in a security proof. It is very easy to observe
that an adversary with unbounded resources is able to break almost all cryptographic
schemes, it is so necessary to reduce the possibilities of an adversary in order to face
a realistic situation. The cryptographers assumption follows Cobham’s thesis [16],
that is the reduction of the feasible adversaries to the algorithms computable in
polynomial time.
1.3. IMPLICIT COMPLEXITY
Finally we need to take care of Probability. Cryptosystems always deal with
probabilistic primitives, because it is necessary to guarantee the right amount of
randomness in the outputs of the protocols (it is possible to prove that a determin-
istic protocol is not semantically secure), furthermore adversaries are modeled as
probabilistic algorithms so we need a calculus that allows us to work with proba-
bilistic constructions. Moreover, when we propose a game we have a probabilistic
algorithm that plays against a probabilistic scheme, so in the moment we want to
say if the adversary wins or not the game in most cases we will have a probabilistic
answer and then we need a calculus that allows us to reason about this probability
and to evaluate it.
Summing up we are looking for a calculus that allows us to model the interaction
between probabilistic polynomial-time bounded (PPT in the following) programs.
1.3 Implicit Complexity
We decide to start from the λ-calculus, a formal system defined by Church to an-
alyze functions. The main features of λ-calculus are simplicity in description and
expressiveness, it is very useful to model programs and to study their evolutions
and behavior. Furthermore typed λ-calculus allows a certain degree of interaction
by the definition of higher-order types and, as we have seen, this is a key point when
we deal with cryptography.
Traditionally, complexity and probability are not aspects of λ-calculus, but there
have been recent progresses that fix these lacks. In the field of the polytime cal-
culus, Hofmann proposed a simply-typed lambda calculus called SLR (Safe Linear
Recursion), which generalizes the characterization of the polytime functions studied
by Bellantoni and Cook to higher order [12]. Hofmann improve Cobham’s charac-
terization of polytime functions applying the work of Bellantoni and Cook which
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allows the use of recursion by a separation of variables into ”safe” and ”normal”
ones [26]. This work offered the basis for the creation of several calculi applied to
cryptography and game-based proofs, indeed there were proposed many extension of
the syntax of SLR by adding probabilistic primitives, in order to obtain the features
required to deal with cryptosystems.
One of the first extension was OSLR, which extend SLR with a 0-1 valued ora-
cle, unfortunately it resulted difficult to build a logic upon the language [35]. Years
later a new extension was proposed by Zhang, CSLR; the most significant feature
of CSLR is the distinction at the type level between deterministic and probabilis-
tic computations [38]. Zhang used CSLR to define a proof system used to justify
computational indistinguishability in a direct way. This proof system may look
similar to the one proposed by Impagliazzo and Kapron, that introduced two log-
ical systems for reasoning about cryptographic construction [28]; the first logic is
based on a non-standard arithmetic model and is proved to capture probabilistic
polynomial-time computations, whereas the second one is focused on computational
indistinguishability and is used to prove the unpredictability of the pseudorandom
generator defined by Goldwasser and Micali [24]. Unfortunately, while the first sys-
tem can be considered quite wide and complete, the second results not precisely
defined and Zhang showed imprecisions in the proof of soundness [38].
An additional extension of CSLR has been developed in 2010, CSLR+; this ex-
tension allows for superpolynomial-time computations and also arbitrary uniform
choices [37]. This thesis is about the RSLR calculus, another SLR extension pre-
sented by Dal Lago and Parisen Toldin for probabilistic polynomial-time computa-
tion, that I will discuss in Chapter 3 [31].
In order to develop the game-based technique and to simplify the automation,
we need to analyze and implement new procedures that offer improvements with-
out loss of mathematical guarantees. The main contribution of this thesis will be a
characterization of Computational Indistinguishability (CI), a key concept in cryp-
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tography, in order to simplify the structure of a proof in a way that can be easily
automated.
1.4 My contribution: a characterization of CI
As already mentioned, indistinguishability plays a central role in cryptographic
proofs, but, what does it mean for two games (or more generally two programs) to
be computationally indistinguishable? Briefly speaking, we consider two programs
computationally indistinguishable if, for every Probabilistic Polynomial Time algo-
rithm A, the probability of A to distinguish between them is negligible, that means
that it can’t distinguish between them.
It is easy to see that the difficulty to establish if two programs are indistinguish-
able or not is focused on the quantification of all possible algorithms; the purpose
of this thesis is to give a characterization of computational indistinguishability that
allows to say if two programs are indistinguishable or not in a easier way, by using
traces instead of arbitrary algorithms.
In order to get this result we will start from Chapter 4 by defining an equivalence
relation based on contexts, terms of RSLR with a hole, that in our system take
the place of PPT algorithms and stand for the feasible adversaries; then we will
propose another equivalence relation based on traces: traces are elements with a
structure simpler than contexts and we will prove that, in our framework, these
two equivalence relations coincide. Furthermore we will propose another approach
to prove equivalence between RSLR terms based on coinduction. Such an approach
will be proved to be sound w.r.t. context equivalence but not complete; it is anyway
interesting to observe this different approach because it allows us to work without
universal quantifications and so in a very simple way.
Next step, in Chapter 5, will be a generalization of the techniques showed in
Chapter 4, by the definition of two different notions of distance, the former based
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on contexts and the latter on traces; we will show once again that the two definitions
are equivalent, but we need to make a small change in the definition of traces.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we will propose a parametric version of context equivalence
and we will show that when we compare base terms (i.e. strings), the parametric con-
text equivalence is equivalent to computational indistinguishability as normally used
by cryptographers; as in the previous cases we will give a definition of parametric
equivalence based on traces and we will prove that it coincides with the paramet-
ric context equivalence. We will conclude this thesis by showing some motivating
examples from cryptographic primitives and protocols (Chapter 7).
Chapter 2
Some Approaches to Computational
Cryptography
In the Introduction we talked about the difficulties and the crisis in proving the
security of a cryptographic scheme due to the exponential growing in the complexity
of the proofs. In order to fix this situation several approaches have been proposed
to help cryptographers to build cryptographic proofs easily: we will start talking
about formal methods that under particular conditions are computationally sound,
then we will talk about automated tools and finally we will describe some methods
based on process calculi and CI.
2.1 Computational Soundness of Formal Proof
Previously, we introduced two different approaches to study the properties of a se-
curity protocol: formal and computational. In the formal approach, also called
symbolic, messages and keys are seen as atomic elements and we assume the per-
fect security of the primitives used in a protocol, whereas in the computational one
messages and keys are bitstring and primitives are functions from bitstrings to bit-
strings; the formal analysis is simpler and easily mechanizable, the computational
one is more precise and therefore more complex, even a small protocol could need a
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very complicated proof.
These two approaches evolved separately for almost twenty years, but in 2000,
Abadi and Rogaway [2] opened a window onto the possibility to merge the two
different approaches, in order to give formal proofs that are computationally sound.
2.1.1 Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography
The goal of Abadi and Rogaway is to call attention to the gap between the com-
putational and the formal points of view and to start to bridge this gap; the main
theorem of their work states that if a symbolic notion of equivalence is proved in
the formal framework, then also the equivalent notion in the computational system
is proved.
The work starts with the description of the formal system and the definition of
the set of expressions that will be used:
M,N, ... :: 0 | 1 | pM,Mq | K | tMuK
where 0, 1 P Bool and K P Keys with Keys fixed non empty set disjoint from
Bool. The expression pM,Nq is the pairing of two expressions and tMuK is the
encryption of M under K; it is important to notice that in this framework we work
only with symmetric encryptions.
The next step is a formal definition of equivalence: this definition starts from
the entailment relation M $ N that intuitively means that N can be deduced from
M , and so it is a way to represent what an adversary can deduce from an expression
M . For example we have pptMuK , tNuK1q, Kq $ K and pptMuK , tNuK1q, Kq $ M ,
but pptMuK , tNuK1q, Kq & N .
Once defined the relation $, two expressions M,N are defined formally equiv-
alent, written M  N , if patternpMq and patternpNq are equal. Patterns are
extensions of expressions with the add of the symbol , that represents an expres-
2.1. COMPUTATIONAL SOUNDNESS OF FORMAL PROOF
sion undecryptable by an adversary, so a pattern is an expression with some parts
that the adversary can’t see.
Given a set of keys T and a pattern M we define ppM,T q inductively as follows:
ppK,T q  K
ppi, T q  i, i P Bool
pppM,Nq, T q  pppM,T q, ppN, T qq
pptMuK , T q  tppM,T quK if K P T ,
 otherwise.
Intuitively, ppM,T q is the pattern that an attacker can see by using the keys included
in T . The expression patternpMq stands for ppM,T q, where T is the set of keys that
can be deduced from M itself.
When Abadi and Rogaway move to the computational point of view, they con-
sider a symmetric encryption scheme Π  pENC,DEC,GENq that is type-0 secure.
The type-0 security is a very strong assumption. Intuitively it means that the en-
cryption hides all the information about the plaintext and the encryption key used.
Another important request in this framework is to work only with acyclic expres-
sions. An expression is acyclic if it doesn’t admit encryption cycles. We have an
encryption cycle when the relation between keys K1 encrypts K2 (that is K1 en-
crypts an expression M that contains K2) is a cyclic relation, for instance tKuK or
ptK1uK2 , tK2uK1q; this possibility often lead to a weakness of the scheme and so it
is denied in Abadi and Rogaway framework.
At this point, given a formal expression M , we associate to M an ensemble JMKΠ,
so that we are able to reason on it from a computational point of view: each key
symbol K is mapped to a string τpKq by using the key generator GEN, the formal
bits 0,1 are mapped to their computational representation, a pair pM,Nq is encoded
by concatenating the images of M and N , ENCpτpKq,Mq is the computational
expression associated to tMuK and each string is tagged with its type (key, bool,
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pair, cyphertext) in order to avoid ambiguities.
So, once defined how associate a formal expression M to an ensemble JMKΠ the
main result of [2] is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1 Let M,N be two acyclic expressions and let Π be a type-0 secure
symmetric encryption scheme. Suppose that M  N then JMKΠ  JNKΠ.
This result links the symbolic equivalence relation defined on patterns to the com-
putational indistinguishability, denoted by , showing for the first time a sound
symbolic abstraction of CI.
As we can easily see the work of Abadi and Rogaway is just a starting point
and over time there have been several extensions of this framework, especially on
two points: logic and encryption. The first logic extensions have been made by
Micciancio and Warinschi, that proved by a counter-example that the logic proposed
by Abadi and Rogaway was not complete; indeed it could be possible to have cases
of false negative, i.e. M  N , but JMKΠ  JNKΠ.
In order to get completeness, Micciancio and Warischi showed that it is sufficient
to request that the encryption scheme is authenticated, that means that an adver-
sary is not able to produce valid cyphertexts [34]. A refinement of this complete-
ness result has been proposed by Gligor and Horvitz, that proposed a new security
definition both sufficient and necessary, weak key-authenticity test for expressions
(WKA-EXP) [27].
In [25] Herzog extends Abadi and Rogaway’s work to a framework independent
of the encryption scheme chosen, in particular he extends the result also to asym-
metric encryption schemes that satisfy the (IND-CCA2) security property, a case in
which the adversary is given access to a decryption oracle that can decrypt arbitrary
adversary’s requests. In [33] the result is extended to a system in which keys are not
elements of a set disjoint form the message set, but are arbitrary expressions. Both of
these extensions continue to present the problem of cyclic expressions; this is due to
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the fact that in formal frameworks key cycles are not considered a threat, whereas in
a computational model the presence of a key cycles can invalidate standard security
properties.
Two different way to handle key cycles have been proposed, the first one based
on giving to the adversary more power, in order to make it able to deduce a key
when it is inside a key cycle [32], the second one based on giving a new security
property, called key-dependant message (KDM), strictly stronger than (IND-CCA2)
and sufficient to ensure soundness even in presence of key cycles [3].
Other extensions can be found in [4], where Ada˜o et al. study which-key and
length-key encryption schemes, [21] where the logic is extended with hash functions
and [15], where the logic is extended with modular exponentiation.
2.1.2 Static Equivalence Soundness
A different approach to computational soundness of symbolic methods is proposed
by Baudet, Cortier and Kremer in [10, 11]; this approach is more general, because
it is independent from the set of primitives chosen in the protocol. The idea is
to express the symbolic secrecy by using the static equivalence instead of patterns.
How does this approach work?
• The first step is the definition of an abstract algebra, a term algebra defined
on a first-order signature with sorts and equipped with an equational theory;
for instance, one of the simplest example of equational theory is EENC, the
equational theory of a symmetric encryption system, generated by the rule:
DECpENCpm, kq, kq EENC m.
• The second step is the definition of two different equivalence relations based
on deducibility, $E, and static equivalence, E, in order to catch the capability
of a symbolic adversary to distinguish between terms. Deducibility is used to
define the terms that can be evaluated by an adversary from a sequence of
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terms and static equivalence to state if two sequence of terms are equivalent
or not.
• At this point a method is proposed to turn the abstract algebra into a concrete
computational algebra in order to reason about the relations between symbolic
and computational model.
• Finally, they start from the equational theory E and from the hypothesis that
E is a reasonable abstraction of the primitives, that means that it is sound
and faithful w.r.t. computational indistinguishability (faithfulness is a stronger
version of completeness); the main contribution of this work is the proof that
also deducibility and static equivalence are two sound and faithful equivalence
relations w.r.t. the computational algebra. Furthermore it is showed that for
many equational theories E soundness is a sufficient criterion for all the other
notions of faithfulness and soundness.
This framework has been used by Abadi, Baudet and Warinschi in [1] for applications
on oﬄine guessing attacks.
Another definition of formal indistinguishability has been proposed by Bana,
Mohassel and Stegers, that found out that static equivalence is a definition too
rough to reason about many equational theories; for instance they proved that static
equivalence is not sound when working with a framework that uses modular expo-
nentiation [7].
2.1.3 Unconditional soundness
Differently from the approaches we talked about hitherto, the framework proposed
by Bana and Comon-Lundh in [5, 6] starts from a different concept: they are not
interested in defining symbolic properties or adding computational constraints to
obtain soundness anymore, but the goal is to define a model in which an adversary is
able to perform any action that does not contradict the computational assumptions.
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This purpose is reached by giving a list of axioms that reproduces the compu-
tational properties of the protocol under study (for instance IND-CCA); once given
the axioms, we can consider the greatest symbolic model that satisfies this list and
reason formally about its security properties. This way we can obtain the compu-
tational soundness almost by definition, because the computational constraints are
included in the axioms and so a computational attacker can be modeled symbolically.
The main feature of this framework is to reduce the security of protocols to an
inconsistency proof for a set of first order formulas: “If the negation of the security
formula is inconsistent with the set of axioms, then the protocol is secure in any
model of the axioms ” [6]. This approach lead to several advantages, for instance:
• The proofs are built in a symbolic setting, so they are simpler and, if possible,
automated.
• It is very simple to add cryptographic primitives, because it is only necessary
to write the corresponding axiomatization.
• It is possible to prove the security properties by using weaker assumption,
simply using a weaker axiomatization.
• The use of an axiomatization makes the assumptions needed to ensure security
properties very clear.
• In order to strengthen the security assumptions, i.e. when an attack is found,
it is sufficient to add an axiom so that we express stronger hypothesis on the
computational implementation of the primitives.
• It is possible to handle many situations that previously had been discarded,
such as key cycles, dynamic corruption and XOR.
However, this approach has been developed recently, so we don’t have concrete
applications of this method yet, but the authors are confident that inconstency
checks could be implemented efficiently.
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2.2 Automated Tools
A significant help in the construction of cryptographic proofs has come from the
creation of tools that, given a security protocol try to elaborate (in a automatic or
semi-automatic way) a proof that can be easily verified. In the following subsections
I will talk about three different tools which are used to demonstrate the security of
a protocol by using game-based proofs: CertyCrypt, EasyCrypt and Cryptoverif.
Game-based security proofs are built as a sequence G0,G1, ...,Gn of games or
experiments. The first game G0 encodes the interaction between a generic algorithm
A that stands for the potential adversary and the last one Gn encodes the adversary
that tries to break the assumption we choose. All the games are in the same prob-
ability space, successive games are very similar and for each game we can evaluate
the probability of the adversary to win the game and we call it the advantage; so,
by using this method we are able to put in relation the probability of an adver-
sary to break the cryptosystem with the probability of an adversary to break the
assumption. The game-based proof structure succeeds in combining the intuition
of a game in describing a security protocol to the accuracy and the formalism of a
mathematical demonstration.
2.2.1 CertiCrypt
CertiCrypt is a machine checked framework, which is used to construct crypto-
graphic proofs structured as sequences of games; the pecularity of the CertyCrypt
framework is that the proofs are built on top of the Coq proof assistant, thus we
have the mathematical guarantee of a certified proof assistant and the possibility to
study these proofs and their verification step by step [8]. Some of the features of
this framework are:
• It is used an imperative programming language with probabilistic assignments,
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structured data types and procedure calls. The choice of such a language is
made in order to be closer to the cryptographer standards in game description.
• The framework doesn’t return asymptotic results, but it focuses on exact secu-
rity; this decision is due to the fact that in this way we can set our parameters
to obtain concrete security bound.
• Every proof yields a proof object which can be checked automatically and
separately.
• The framework is equipped with automated reasoning methods, it’s formalized
as relational Hoare logic and a theory of observational equivalence.
The probabilistic programming language follows this construction:
C ::= skip nop
| C;C sequence
| VÐ E assignment
| VÐ$ DE random sampling
| if E then C else C conditional
| while E do C while loop
| VÐ PpE, ...,Eq procedure call
where V represents the set of variables, E the set of expressions, DE the set of
distribution expression and P the set of procedures.
In the CertyCrypt framework we have that programs are seen as functions start-
ing from an initial memory m to sub-probability distribution over final memories. To
describe the semantics of programs a distribution that maps a [0,1]-valued random
variable, i.e. a function in A Ñ r0, 1s to its expected value, is used. This function
is defined of type DpAq  pA Ñ r0, 1sq Ñ r0, 1s. Given a distribution µ P D and
a function f : A Ñ r0, 1s we have that µpfq represents the expected value of the
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function f .
So we can consider a program as a function which maps an initial memory m to
a distribution on final memories and write its semantics as:
Jc P CK : MÑ DpMq
Where M is the set of memories.
When we study a security protocol we don’t know how an adversary could rea-
son and which strategies he could use to break the cryptosystem; the only way to
model an adversary without loss of generality is giving him an interface and a set
of rules which specify what he can or can’t do. An adversary interface consists in a
triplepO,RW,Rq, where O represents the set of procedures he can call, RW repre-
sents the set of variables the adversary can read and write, R represents the set of
variables the adversary can only read. The rules are generic, they are only given in
order to be sure that the adversary makes a correct use of variables and procedures.
2.2.2 Game transitions in CertyCrypt Framework
The CertyCrypt framework follows Shoup classification, and divides transitions be-
tween games in a proof into three categories:
1. Transition which are based on indistinguishability.
2. Transition based on failure event.
3. Transition based on bridging steps.
All these transitions are justified by using a probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic
(pRHL); such approach is useful because it generalizes observational equivalence
and allows us to reason about probabilities of events into different games [8]. A
pRHL judgment has the following structure:
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Definition 1 We define two programs c1, c2 equivalent with respect to pre-condition
Ψ and post condition Φ iff:
$ c1  c2 : Ψ ñ Φ
def
 @ m1,m2.m1Ψm2 ñ pJc1Km1qΦ#pJc2Km2q
This definition means that given two arbitrary initial memories m1,m2 that satisfy
the pre-condition Ψ, i.e. m1Ψm2, we have that two programs c1, c2 are equiva-
lent if their evaluation from the initial memories satisfies the post condition Φ, i.e.
pJc1Km1qΦ#pJc2Km2q.
By using this kind of judgment we can derive the observational equivalence ,
a particular case of the equivalence defined above and a key property in game tran-
sitions; two programs c1, c2 are observationally equivalent if they can be proved
equivalent by using pre- and post- conditions restricted to I ,O, i.e. equalities
over a subset of program variables (Input and Output). So we have:
$ c1 
I
O c2
def
 $ c1  c2 : IñO
CertyCrypt takes advantage of the observation equivalence property because it re-
sults easily mechanizable.
CertyCrypt settles the case of a game transition which depends on what cryp-
tographers call failure event, by using the following fundamental lemma. This case
occurs when we have two games G1, G2, two events A,B and we face with a situation
in which the probability that the event A occurs in G1 is the same as the proba-
bility the event B occurs in G2 unless the verification of an exact event F , which
is called failure event. The fundamental lemma allows to bound the difference of
probability of an event in two different games, it tells us that the difference between
the probabilities that A occurs in G1 and B occurs in G2 is bounded by the greatest
probability that F occurs in G1 or G2.
Theorem 2.2 (Fundamental Lemma) Let G1, G2 be two games and A,B, F three
events.
2.2. AUTOMATED TOOLS
If PrrG1 : A^ F s  PrrG2 : B ^ F s, then we have:
|PrrG1 : As  PrrG2 : Bs| ¤ maxpPrrG1 : F s, P rrG2 : F sq
This theorem is important because it states that we can reduce the probability
to observe difference between two programs to the probability of the occurence
of a sigle event. Roughly speaking, we can say that a program that returns a
cyphertext is indistinguishable from a program that returns a random message unless
the adversary is able to figure out the key of the cryptographic scheme; so the
probability for the adversary to distinguish between the two programs is equal to
the probability to get the key.
Finally we have game transition based on bridging steps: it occurs that a frag-
ment of code c1 in a game G1 is replaced by an observational equivalent fragment
c2 in a game G2.
These substitutions are implemented by using techniques such a deadcode elimina-
tion, constant folding and propagation, procedure call inlining, swapping statement,
common prefix/suffix elimination.
In conclusion, we have a fully automated verification tool based on Coq with an
understandable semantics, which uses a clear set of techniques (that are proved to
be sound) to obtain verifiable proofs of security property of cryptoprotocols. These
tools needs only few Coq lines to establish the security statements and allows the
user to study the proof step by step, without being an expert of Coq.
2.2.3 EasyCrypt
In the last years a new automated tool for elaborating security proofs of cryptopro-
tocols has been developed; indeed, despite the similarity between the CertyCrypt
language and the usual cryptographers standards in describing games, the frame-
work didn’t achieve resounding success between the community. The reason of the
lacking use by the community may be related to the fact that even if CertyCrypt
2.2. AUTOMATED TOOLS
offers security proofs with high guarantees, building a machine-checked proof results
hard and expertise necessary. In order to fill this gap, a new tool has been presented,
which is supposed to be easier to use than his predecessors but trustworthy in the
same way [9].
EasyCrypt is an automated tool which elaborates security proofs of cryptosys-
tem from proof sketches, that are checked by using off-the-shelf SMT solvers and
automated theorem provers. These proofs are given in form of games and the idea
behind is the same as in CertyCrypt, that is to study and evaluate relations between
game transitions such as:
PrrG : As ¤ PrrG1 : A1s  ∆
where G,G1 are games, A,A1 are events and ∆ is a quantity which depends on the
oracle calls made by an adversary.
The structure of EasyCrypt is similar to CertyCrypt, indeed the transitions
between games are justified firstly by proving the logical relations using the proba-
bilistic Relational Hoare Logic and then by applying information-theoretic reasoning
to derive probability claims about the occurring of events. In order to increase the
speed of the calculation EasyCrypt implements a procedure that produces a set
of verification conditions that are sufficient to establish the validity of a certain
judgment. This feature is a key point of the effectiveness of EasyCrypt, indeed a pe-
culiarity of this tool is that the verification conditions are expressed in a first-order
logic as follows:
Ψ,Φ : b |  Ψ | Ψ^ Φ | Ψ_ Φ | Ψ Ñ Φ | Ψ Ø Φ | pΦq | @x.Φ | Dx.Φ
This kind of expressions avoid the reasoning about probabilities and allow the use
of SMT solvers and theorem provers to discharge automatically their validity; prob-
abilities of events are evaluated by additional automated mechanism by using some
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elementary rules. Furthermore the procedure that generates the verification con-
dition also adds Coq files which can be checked separately (For instance by using
CertyCrypt).
The strategy used to generate the set of verification conditions bases on the
following points:
1. The procedures which aren’t called by the adversary are canceled from games
by inlining their definitions, so that only adversary calls remain.
2. The random assignments are moved upfront, so that the code is divided into
two parts, the random and the deterministic one.
3. The deterministic part of the code is studied by a relational weakest precondi-
tion calculus by using relational specification to deal with the adversary calls.
4. A map f is used to generate the verification condition Ψ ñf Φ, defined as:
@m1,m2 t1, ...tl. m1Ψm2 ñ m1t~t{~xu Φ m2tfpt1, ..., tlq{~yu
The injectivity of the map f is generally a sufficient condition to guarantee
that the validity of Ψ ñf Φ entails the validity of the corresponding pRHL
judgment.
5. Off-the-shelf tools establish the validity of the first-order formula Ψ ñf Φ.
EasyCrypt generates its verification conditions in Why tool format and then
uses the Simplify prover and the alt-ergo SMT solver to discharge the condi-
tions.
As happens in CertyCrypt, a fundamental lemma is given in order to justify transi-
tion based on a failure event.
Lemma 2.1 (Fundamental Lemma): Let G1, G2 be two games and A,B, F
events such that:
|ù G1  G2 : Ψ ñ pF x1y Ø F x2yq ^ p F x1y Ñ pAx1y Ø Bx2yqq
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Then if m1Ψm2
1. PrrG1,m1 : A^ F s  PrrG2,m2 : B ^ F s
2. |PrrG1,m1 : As  PrrG2,m2 : Bs| ¤ PrrG1,m1 : F s  PrrG2,m2 : F s
EasyCrypt presents a limitation in the language, which lacks loops, recursive
procedures and drawing from skewed distributions; furthermore it only generates
partial verifiable evidences and, as said previously, EasyCrypt only generates proof
skeletons for claims about probabilities rather than fully-machine checked proofs.
2.2.4 CryptoVerif
CryptoVerif is a computational sound mechanized prover for cryptographic proto-
cols; it returns results about secrecy and correspondence properties of protocols
and also provides generic methods for specifying properties of cryptographic primi-
tives [14]. CryptoVerif works for a bounded number of sessions N, which is polyno-
mial in the security parameter, in presence of active adversaries. As the precedent
tools, CryptoVerif focus its goal in results of exact security, so it returns a bound of
the probability of a successful attack against the protocol under study.
As seen previously, CryptoVerif gives proofs as sequences of games, so we have
that the first game represents a real protocol, while the last stands for an ideal pro-
tocol, where the occurring of a security property or not results obvious. We can find
the first difference from the two previous tools in the formalization of games, indeed
CryptoVerif uses a process calculus inspired from the pi calculus (substantially it
uses an extension of the pi calculus); the semantics is pure probabilistic, instead of
non-deterministic, and we have an extension which allows us to work with arrays,
that replaces lists in cryptographic proofs.
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The transitions between games are made by using two techniques: the obser-
vational equivalence and the syntactic transformation. We say that two games are
observationally equivalent, and we write G  G1 if every adversary has a negligible
probability to distinguish them. We define in CryptoVerif an adversary as a context,
and we have that G  G1 ñ CrGs  CrG1s for all acceptable evaluation context. So
our purpose is to obtain a sequence of this form:
G0  G1      Gm
that implies G0  Gm.
Transition based on observational equivalence are given as axioms and come from
security properties of the primitives inside the protocol. On the other hand syntactic
transformation are substantially simplifications of the code and expansions of the
arguments: for instance there happens a renaming of variables which are assigned
several times, a merge of several variables into a single array variable, a replace of
variables with its value and so on.
A particular feature of CryptoVerif is the possibility of making a syntactic trans-
formation manually: it is possible to insert manually an event or an instruction and
also to replace a term with another term the the tool verifies to be really equal,
before continuing the demonstration.
The results obtained by CryptoVerif are encouraging beyond any doubt, but the
tools presents evident limitations; indeed it sometimes happens that the prover fails
in proving a particular security property when it doesn’t hold. Furthermore some-
times (In some public-key protocols) the tool stops and waits for manual instruction
to continue the demonstration. In order to go beyond these limits there will be
improved extension turned towards improvements in the proof strategy and handles
of more equations.
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Summing up, we recalled three different tools that return cryptographic proofs
in the form of sequences of games; despite the giant steps made recently these tools
have evident limitations, so it is necessary to find new methods that are easily
mechanizable in order to enlarge the power of these tools and to extend the set of
primitives and protocols that can be analyzed automatically.
2.3 Computational Indistinguishability, Logics, and
Calculi
In this section we will talk about a kind of approach that is quite close to the one
we expose in this thesis. The idea is to propose a method to reason about CI in a
framework based on a process calculus suitably defined to handle cryptographic con-
structions and to model all and only feasible adversaries. The goal of this approach
is to increase the means of cryptographers in building security proofs by showing
new methods to prove computational indistinguishability.
2.3.1 A Process Calculus
In [36] Mitchell et al. studied properties of a process calculus designed to analyze
security protocols; this calculus is a variant of CCS, where bounded replications and
Probabilistic Polynomial-Time (PPT) expressions in messages are allowed. A feature
of this calculus is that all the processes evaluate in polynomial time; this choice is
obviously made to reason about security problems, where adversaries have a limited
power of calculus. Moreover, we have that messages are scheduled probabilistically,
rather than nondeterministically in order to avoid inconsistency between security
and nondeterminism.
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Expressions in this calculus are defined by the following grammar:
P ::H | νpcq.P | inpc, xq.pPq | outpc,Tq.pPq | rTs.pPq | pP|Pq | !qpνq.pPq
where T is a term that could be a variable or the security parameter η or a random
coin or a probabilistic polynomial time function θ of arity k, applied to k terms
T1, ..,Tk.
H is the empty process, νpcq.P is the channel binding of the channel c in the process
P, inpc, xq.pPq is the input expression, it waits for an input from the channel c and
then performs P, outpc,Tq.pPq is the output expression, it reduces T in atoms and
sends in output the results through the channel c, rTs.pPq is the match expression, it
proceeds with P if the guarding term T reduces to 1, pP|Pq is the parallel composition
and !qpνq.pPq is the bounded replication of P. Context expressions are defined by the
following grammar:
Crs ::H | inpc, xq.pCrsq | outpc,Tq.pCrsq | rTs.pCrsq
| pCrs|Pq | pP|Crsq | !qpνq.pCrsq
In this framework security properties are expressed by the use of observational
equivalence. Two processes P,Q are said to be observational equivalent, we write
P  Q if for all contexts Crs the behavior of CrPs is asymptotically computationally
indistinguishable from the behavior of CrQs. This is formalized by the following
definition:
Definition 2 Let P,Q be two process and let ValpP,Qq be the set of all valuations
of free variables of P and Q. We say that P  Q if:
@ξ P ValpP,Qq. @Crs : ξpCrPsq  ξpCrQsq
The expression P  Q it is used to state that P,Q are asymptotically close, it means
that the probability for P and Q to generate a different observable is negligible in
the security parameter.
2.3. COMPUTATIONAL INDISTINGUISHABILITY, LOGICS, AND CALCULI
The observational equivalence is proved to be a congruence and it is also devel-
oped a form of probabilistic bisimulation that works as a sound method for demon-
strating observational equivalence and is also used to prove the soundness of a proof
system for reasoning about protocols. Furthermore it is proved that two processes
are asymptotically observationally equivalent if and only if they are computationally
indistinguishable. The idea is that observational equivalence tells us that if we want
to analyze a protocol P and we have a protocol Q which is an idealized form of P
where all channels are secure, then proving P  Q means that P is secure.
Finally, in the last section of the work, there are several application of the cal-
culus and the proof system to well-known cryptographic constructions.
2.3.2 First-Order Logic
In [28], Impagliazzo and Kapron propose two systems to reason about cryptographic
construction; the goal of this work is to propose a framework that is sufficiently
powerful to study most of the primitives commonly used in cryptography, but also
simple enough to be used in the analysis of combinations or changes of primitives
when applied in protocols. It can be easily noticed that the difficulties in developing
such system are in formulation of security definitions, reasoning about probability
and randomness, quantification of the computational power of adversaries, wrong
use of induction in security proofs, and in order to overcome this issues concepts from
cryptography, implicit computational complexity and proof complexity are mixed
together.
The first logic system, called T , is a first-order logic system whose aim is to
reason about probabilities, asymptotic and polynomial time functions. The system
is composed by:
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• A security parameter, that is essential to reason about cryptographic construc-
tions and it is assumed to be large enough to handle asymptotic statement.
• Strings, used to represent inputs, outputs and random tapes. Strings must be
of polynomial length and they can be seen as integers so that it is possible to
work with arithmetical operations.
• Moderate integers, that is polynomially bounded by the security parameter.
They are used for instance to express negligible functions.
• Feasible functions, that is polynomial time functions from strings to strings.
They can be defined by composition or (particular) recursion.
• Counting integers, used to represent sizes of set of strings. These integers are
useful when we want to determine the size of the set of strings that satisfy a
particular formula and so it is functional when we reason about probabilities.
• Formulas, defined from the atomic formulas: t  s, t ¤ s by the connectives
 ,^,_,Ñ, and quantifiers @, D .
Once given the syntax of the system it is proposed an axiomatizations made of
a list of axioms divided in: logical, security parameter, basic, poly-time functions,
counting and induction; this axiomatizations is necessary to introduce the notion of
derivation.
Given two formulas ϕ, ψ, we write T, ϕ $ ψ if ψ can be derived from ϕ and instances
of the axioms in T ; so we get the soundness theorem:
Theorem 2.3 Suppose that ϕ1, ϕ2, ψ are bounded formulas such that:
T, ϕ2p~f, ~f
1q @g@~zϕ1p~f, g, ~z, sq $ @g@~zψp~f
1, g, ~z, sq
where ~f, ~f 1 are sequences of function variables and s is the security parameter. We
then have the following for all sequences ~α, ~α1 of poly-tyme functions: if ~α, ~α1 satisfy
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ϕ2 in N and for every poly-time function β, ϕ1 holds asymptotically in N, then for
every poly-time function β, ψ holds asymptotically in N.
The meaning of this theorem is that f is a cryptographic primitive and f 1 is built
from f , we use the formula ϕ2 to define f
1 in function of f . The formulas ϕ1 and ψ
formalize the security of f and f 1 respectively, whereas g is a function that stands
for a poly-time adversary. The soundness theorem tells us that if it is possible to
derive ψ from ϕ1 then we have a sound proof of the security of f
1 by using the
assumption on the security of f .
The T system is quite wide and general, it is conceived to reason about arbitrary
cryptographic constructions, however it doesn’t avoid any explicit reasoning about
probabilities. This is why Impagliazzo and Kapron propose a second logic system
focused on computational indistinguishability. This system is composed by the rules
in Figure 2.1.
T $ Q1, ..., Qkps  tq
UNIV
let b1in ...let bkin s  let b1in ...let bkin t
u  u1 (SUB)
vtu{xu  vtu{xu
let iÐ randpppnqq in u  letiÐ randpppnqq in uti 1{iu
(H-IND)
ut0{iu  utpp1
nq{iu
(EDIT)
let

 ~iÐ randp~ppnqq
xÐ rsp
°k
j1ppjpnq  ijqq

in x 

 ~iÐ randp~ppnqq
xÐ rspppnqq

in ©kji xjt1...pjpnqiju
Figure 2.1: Rules for CI (Impagliazzo, Kapron)
We don’t go into details of the second system syntax, we just explain the meaning
of each rule. In the rule (UNIV), each Qi is a universal quantifier and bi a random
bitstring, the aim of this rule is to relate the universally quantified equality statement
provable in T to . The (SUB) rule tells us that we are able to substitute terms
that are computationally indistinguishable into PPT contexts. The (EDIT) rule
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allows us to merge, split and/or shorten random strings and we get a result that is
indistinguishable from a random string of the appropriate length. Finally (H-IND)
can be seen as an induction rule.
The soundness proof of this system is made by analyzing each rule and interpret-
ing it in the general system. Finally this system is used to prove the correctness of
a pseudorandom generator built by using the property of next-bit unpredictability.
2.3.3 A λ-Calculus
A similar approach to computational indistinguishability has been made by Zhang,
that developed a logic for reasoning about CI starting from a language called com-
putational SRL(CSLR) [38]; this language is an extension of Hofmann’s SRL and its
main feature is to capture the class of probabilistic polynomial time computation so
that it is very useful to model cryptographic constructions and adversaries.
The syntax of CSLR is defined starting from terms of SLR:
e1, e2, ... :: x | nil | B0 | B1 | caseτ | recτ | λx.e | e1e2
xe1, e2y | proj1e | proj2e | e1 b e2 | let xb y  e1in e2
and adding terms for probabilistic computations as:
e1, e2, ... :: ... | rand | valpeq | bind x  e1in e2
In this syntax we have that nil is the empty string, B0,B1 are bitstring constructors,
caseτ is the term for case distinction, recτ is for safe recursion, λx.e is a lambda
abstraction, e1e2 is an application, xe1, e2y is a product, proji are product projections,
e1be2 is a tensor product and let xby  e1in e2 is a tensor projection. Furthermore,
rand is an oracle bit that returns 0 or 1 with probability 1{2, valpeq is the deterministic
computation and bind x  e1in e2 is a sequential computation.
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The type system, necessary to ensure the polytime soundness, is also inherited
from SLR; types are defined by:
τ, τ 1, ... :: Bits | τ  τ 1 | τ b τ 1 |  τ Ñ τ 1 | τ Ñ τ 1 | τ ( τ 1 | Tτ
Bits is the base type, τ  τ 1 is the cartesian product, τ b τ 1 is the tensor product;
τ Ñ τ 1 is for modal function with no restrictions on arguments, τ Ñ τ 1 is for
non-modal functions where the arguments must be safe arguments and τ ( τ 1 is
for linear functions. The type Tτ is part of the extension and it is called monadic
or computation type; it is used for computations that return a value of type τ .
The proof system developed by Zhang is composed by two different set of rules:
the first one is used to reason about semantic equivalence, denoted with , whereas
the second is made by rules to justify computational indistinguishability, denoted
with . We focus now our attention to the second one, in figure 2.2, that is is quite
similar to the one proposed by Impagliazzo and Kapron.
$ ei : BitsÑ τ pi  1, 2q e1  e2
EQUIVe1  e2
$ ei : BitsÑ τ pi  1, 2, 3q e1  e2 e2  e3
TRANS-INDISTe1  e3
x : Bits, y : τ $ e : τ 1 $ ei : BitsÑ τ pi  1, 2q e1  e2
SUB
λx.ere1pxq{ys  λx.ere2pxq{ys
x : Bits, nBits $ e : τ λn.eru{xs is numerical for all bitstrings u
λx.eripxq{ns  λx.erB1ipxq{ns for all canonical polynomial i such that |i| ¤ |p|
H-IND
λx.ernil{ns  λx.erppxq{ns
Figure 2.2: Rules for CI (Zhang)
One of the difference of this system from the one proposed by Impagliazzo and
Kapron is the absence of a rule (EDIT); this is due to the fact that in CSLR there
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are no primitives that modify bitstrings, except for the two bitstring constructor.
Another difference can be found in the H-IND rules, because in this logic there
is not a primitive that returns uniformly a number smaller than a polynomial. It
is finally important to notice that the TRANS-INDIST rule does not break any
assumption about the complexity constraint. By the add of some useful lemmas,
Zhang shows how this proof system can be used to analyze cryptographic examples
of pseudorandom generators.
In his joint work with Nowak, Zhang propose CSLR+, an extension of the lan-
guage realised to allow the possibility to work with games that use superpolynomial
time computations or arbitrary uniform distributions [37]; this feature is necessary
to handle security definitions, but the construction of adversaries and cryptographic
primitives is still bounded polinomially. This add lead Nowak and Zhang to intro-
duce the notion of game indistinguishability, a definition that is not stronger than
computational indistinguishability, but it is more appropriate in a game-based proof
framework.
One of the contribution of this work is the proof that computational indistin-
guishability implies game indistinguishability, so it is still possible to use the proof
system in [38] in proof. Nowak and Zhang also show concrete applications of the
proof system, by implementing in CSRL the public key encryption scheme of El-
Gamal and proving it secure; this proof relies on the formalization of the decisional
Diffie-Hellmann assumption, i.e. the nonexistence of a computational algorithm
able to distinguish between the triples pγx, γy, γxyq and pγx, γy, γzq when x, y, z are
chosen randomly. Another contribution is the implementation and the security def-
inition of the Blum-Blum-Shub pseudorandom generator.
In this chapter we discussed some of the approaches used to enlarge the set of
primitives and protocols that can be studied by the computational point of view:
we started from formal methods computationally sound, then we talked about dif-
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ferent authomated tools and we end with the description of some process calculi
endowed with a proof system to reason aboun computational indistinguishability,
an approach very close to the one proposed in this thesis. In the following chapter
we will introduce the calculus we will use to model our framework, RSLR, a typed
λ-calculus for PPT computations, that we will use to model cryptographic schemes
and adversaries.
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Chapter 3
A Calculus for PPT Computation: RSLR
In this first section we present RSLR, a λcalculus for probabilistic polynomial
time computations. The choice to use RSLR is based on the fact that the final
goal of this thesis is to offer a method to study computational indistinguishability,
where an adversary A, an algorithm with a polynomial power of calculus, takes
in input two different programs once each and tries to distinguish between them;
as we will see in the following, the main feature of this calculus is that the set
of probabilistic functions that can be computed by RSLR terms coincides with the
polytime computable ones, so essentially, the idea behind this choice is that we
can use an RSLR term to describe whatever algorithm A. We will formalize this
concept when we will talk about contexts, RSLR terms with a hole, that represent
in this system the adversaries that takes in input a term and, once studied, return
an output.
The other feature of RSLR that pushed us to this choice is the presence of a
probabilistic operator. The possibility to work with probability and to write proba-
bilistic programs is crucial when we deal with cryptography, indeed it is well-known
that a deterministic cryptographic primitive is not semantically secure.
RSLR, which stands for Random Safe Linear Recursion, is obtained by extending
Hofmann’s SLR with an operator for binary probabilistic choice. One of the dif-
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ferences between RSLR and other languages obtained from Hofmann’s SLR is that
polynomial time soundness is proved operationally instead of semantically and so it
brings to some necessary restrictions from the original SLR. Furthermore in SLR we
have two different function spaces, whereas in RSLR these two spaces collapse into
one; this difference comes from the fact that, in presence of higher-order duplication,
it results very difficult to control the size of reducts when we normalize. Thus, as
a consequence, RSLR merges the two function spaces and, by using a strict type
system, prevents the duplication of arguments of higher-order type.
In this work we will use a version of RSLR which is slightly different from the
original one proposed in [31]: we consider a version in which base terms are bistring
instead of natural numbers and a call-by-value reduction; this way we obtain a
simpler exposition of the theory without losing expressiveness.
3.1 Syntax and Semantics
As we disclosed, RSLR is a typed lambda calculus for probabilistic polynomial time
computation; the type system adopted by RSLR is crucial to ensure the polynomial
complexity and it is based on the idea that variables of a certain type can appear in
a term only once. We introduce the type system by defining the category of type.
Definition 3 (Types) Types in RSLR are defined as follows:
A :: Str | AÑ A |  AÑ A
We can easily see that we have one base type Str which stands for bitstrings and two
different function spaces: the first one, characterized by the type AÑ A describes
all the function that are evaluated in constant time whereas the the one, AÑ A is
for the functions that require a time of computation that is polynomial in the size
of the argument.
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In order to highlight the fact that A Ñ A is a subtype of A Ñ A, RSLR
provides for a notion of aspects, denoted with metavariables a, b, which is used to
formalize the concept of subtyping.
Definition 4 We define an aspect as  or ; we define a partial order between
aspects by using the binary relation tp, q, p,q, p,qu, that is noted with  :.
Now we are able to give the system of subtyping rules, as described in figure 3.1.
A  : A
A  : B B  : C
A  : C
B  : A C  : D a  : b
aAÑ C  : bBÑ D
Figure 3.1: Subtyping Rules
At this point we go into the core of the language by describing the syntax of
RSLR.
Definition 5 The synctatical categories of values and terms are defined by the
following grammar:
v :: m | λx : aA.t;
t :: x | v | 0ptq | 1ptq | tailptq | tt | caseApt, t, t, tq | recApt, t, t, tq | rand;
As we can see we have that values are given by strings, denoted with m, which range
over the set of finite binary strings t0, 1u and by lambda abstractions; terms are
given by variables, where x ranges over a denumerable set of variables X, two string
constructors 0, 1 and a string destructor tail. Furthermore we have applications
and a nonstandard constant rand that returns 0 or 1 with probability 1{2. The terms
caseApt, t0, t1, tq and recApt, t0, t1, tq are terms for case distinction and safe recursion,
in which the first argument specifies the term (of tipe Str) which guides the process.
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We give in figure 3.2 a one step semantics in order to explain better the behaviour
of terms in RSLR; we use  to denote the empty string, b P t0, 1u to denote a single
bit, and t0
1
2 , 1
1
2 u for the distribution that assigns the values 0, 1 with probability 1
2
.
xÑ x; v Ñ v;
0pmq Ñ 0m; 1pmq Ñ 1m;
tailpq Ñ ; tailpbmq Ñ m;
pλx.tqv Ñ ttv{xu; randÑ t0
1
2 , 1
1
2 u;
caseAp, t0, t1, tq Ñ t; recAp, t0, t1, tq Ñ t
caseAp0m, t0, t1, tq Ñ t0; recAp0m, t0, t1, tq Ñ pt00mqprecApm, t0, t1, tqq
caseAp1m, t0, t1, tq Ñ t1; recAp1m, t0, t1, tq Ñ pt11mqprecApm, t0, t1, tqq
Figure 3.2: RSLR One-Step Semantics Rules
The presence of the probabilistic term rand in the syntax of RSLR makes the
operational semantics probabilistic; indeed we have that any closed term does not
evaluate to a single value but to a value distribution. A value distribution is a
function D : V Ñ Rr0,1s such that
°
vPVDpvq  1; if
°
vPVDpvq   1 then D is
called value sub-distribution. The evaluation of a term t to a value distribution D is
expressed by using the judgment t ó D; the set of the values v such that Dpvq  0
is called the support of D and it’s denoted by SpDq. We denote a value distribution
D with tpviq
piuiPI where tviuiPI  SpDq and pi  Dpviq for all i P I. Given two value
distributions (or sub-distribution) D,E and a number p P r0, 1s we denote:
D  E  tpvqDpvq EpvquvPSpDqYSpEq
p D  tpvqpDpvquvPSpDq
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v ó tv1u rand ó t0
1
2 , 1
1
2 u
t ó D s ó E trtv{xu ó Fr,vuλx.r,v
ts ó
°
λx.r,vDpλx.rq  Epvq  Fr,v
t ó tpmiq
piu
0ptq ó tp0miq
piu
t ó tpmiq
piu
1ptq ó tp1miq
piu
t ó D Tpmiq  t0mi, 1miu
tailptq ó tpmiq
DpTpmiqqu
t ó D t0 ó D0 t1 ó D1 t ó D
caseApt, t0, t1, tq ó
°
mDp0mq D0  
°
mDp1mq D1  Dpq D
t ó D
t ó D
tpt0mqprecApn, t0, t1, tqq ó Dmum0n
tpt1mqprecApn, t0, t1, tqq ó Dmum1n
recApt, t0, t1, tq ó
°
mDpmqDm
Figure 3.3: Big-Step Semantics Rules
The operational semantics of a term in RSLR is given by the rules in figure 3.3.
Now we can go into details and illustrate the whole type system that is used
in RSLR. First of all we define a typing context Γ as a finite set of assignments of
an aspect and a type to a variable, where every variable occurs at most once; an
assignment is indicated with x : aA. We use the expression with a simple comma
Γ,∆ for the disjoint union of two typing contexts Γ and ∆; when we want emphasize
that Γ only involve variables of base type Str we use the semicolon as in Γ; ∆. Typing
judgment are in the form Γ $ t : A and the complete type system is given by the
rules in figure 3.4. It is easy to observe how this type system enforces variables of
higher order type to occur free at most once and outside the scope of a recursion;
moreover the type of a term that serves as step-function in a recursion is assumed to
be -free and these are key points that allow the calculus to characterize polytime
functions. We define TAΓ,V
A
Γ as the sets of terms and values of type A under the
typing context Γ. In particular, we are interested in TAH,V
A
H, the sets of closed terms
and closed values (i.e. without free variables).
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x : aA P Γ
Γ $ x : A Γ $ m : Str
Γ $ t : Str
Γ $ 0ptq : Str
Γ $ t : Str
Γ $: 1ptq : Str
Γ $ t : Str
Γ $ tailptq : Str $ rand : Str
Γ $ t : A A  : B
Γ $ t : B
Γ; ∆1 $ t : Str Γ; ∆3 $ t1 : A
Γ; ∆2 $ t0 : A Γ; ∆4 $ t : A
Γ; ∆1,∆2,∆3,∆4 $ caseApt, t0, t1, tq : A
Γ; ∆1 $ t : aAÑ B
Γ; ∆2 $ s : A Γ,∆2  : a
Γ; ∆1,∆2 $ ts : B
Γ1; ∆1 $ t : Str Γ1,Γ2,Γ3; ∆2 $ t : A
Γ1,Γ2 $ t0 : StrÑ AÑ A Γ1,∆1  : 
Γ1,Γ3 $ t1 : StrÑ AÑ A A is -free
Γ1,Γ2,Γ3; ∆1,∆2 $ recApt, t0, t1, tq : A
Γ, x : aA $ t : B
Γ $ λx : aA.t : aAÑ B
Figure 3.4: RSLR Typing System
Lemma 3.1 (Subject reduction) Given a term t such that $ t : A, if it reduces
to t1, ..., tn, we have that $ ti : A.
Proof: This is proved by induction on the type derivation [31]. l
Lemma 3.2 For every term t P TAH there is a unique value distribution D such that
t ó D and we denote it with JtK. Moreover, if v P SpDq then v P VAH.
Proof: We proceed by induction on the structure of t.
• If we have a value v, then by the rules it converges to tv1u.
• Similarly if we have a term rand the only distribution it can converge is t0 12 , 1 12 u.
• Suppose now to have t1t2, and suppose t1t2 ó D, t1t2 ó D1, i.e. that two
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distributions exist for t1, t2. By construction we have:
D 
¸
λx.t,v
D1pλx.tq D2pvq Dt,v D
1 
¸
λx.t1,v1
D11pλx.t
1q D12pv
1q D1t1,v1
But, by induction hypothesis we have D1  D
1
1,D2  D
1
2 and so also Dt,v 
D1t1,v1 and this means D  D
1.
• All the other cases are similar.
The second point comes from the RSLR property of subject reduction, so by com-
bining the fact that the type is preserved by reduction and the uniqueness of D we
have that for all v P SpDq,$ v : A. l
The main feature of RSLR is the polytime soundness and completeness; before
presenting this result, we define a probabilistic function on t0, 1u as a function
F : t0, 1u Ñ Pt0,1u , where Pt0,1u is the set of probabilistic distributions. A term
t P TaAÑBH is said to compute F if for every string m P t0, 1u
 it holds that tm ó D,
where Dpnq  F pmqpnq, for every n P t0, 1u. This means that tm evaluates to the
same probability distribution of Fm, so, the probability to get the value n as result
of tm is the same as the probabilty to have n as result of Fm. Now we can recall
the main characteristic of RSLR, a result which is well-known and can be proved in
various ways.
Theorem 3.1 The set of probabilistic functions which can be computed by RSLR
terms coincide with the polytime computable ones.
3.2 Examples of Programs in RSLR
We use this section to propose some programs written as RSLR terms; the purpose
is to describe the calculus and to introduce some programs that will be useful in the
following when we’ll deal with security examples.
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We start with two programs t, s that receive a string in input. The first one is
the identity. The second one, instead, produces a random string and compare it to
the one received in input; if they are different it is the identity, otherwise it returns
the opposite.
t : λx : Str.x s : λx : Str.caseStrpx  pRBG xq, x, x, xq
Where:
RBG : λy : Str.recStrpy, fRBG, fRBG, q
fRBG : λw : Str.λz : Str.caseStrprand, 0pzq, 1pzq, q
Notice that, even if we haven’t defined = and  , they are easily implementable in
RSLR.
We give now a simple example of how the big step semantics of a RSLR term is
evaluated; we observe the term RBG applied to a string 01.
JRBG 01K JRBGKpλy.recStrpy, fRBG, fRBG, qq  J01Kp01q  JrecStrp01, fRBG, fRBG, qK
1  1  JrecStrp01, fRBG, fRBG, qK 
J01Kp01q  JpfRBG01qprecStrp1, fRBG, fRBG, qqK  JpfRBG01qprecStrp1, fRBG, fRBG, qqK
We can easily say that JfRBG01K  JfRBGt01{wuK  tpλz.caseStrprand, 0pzq, 1pzq, qq1u.
Furthermore we have:
JrecStrp1, fRBG, fRBG, qK J1Kp1q  JpfRBG1qprecStrp, fRBG, fRBG, qqK
So, by the fact that JrecStrp, fRBG, fRBG, qK  t1u we have:
JrecStrp1, fRBG, fRBG, qK JcaseStrprand, 0pq, 1pq, qK JrandKp0q  J0pqK  JrandKp1q  J1pqK  t0 12 , 1 12 u
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So, by substituting we have:
JRBG 01K JpfRBG01qprecStrp1, fRBG, fRBG, qqK 

1
2
 JcaseStrprand, 0p0q, 1p0q, qK  1
2
 JcaseStrprand, 0p1q, 1p1q, qK 

1
2
 t00
1
2 , 10
1
2 u  
1
2
 t01
1
2 , 11
1
2 u 
t00
1
4 , 01
1
4 , 10
1
4 , 11
1
4 u
Summing up, in this section we have introduced the calculus we will use in the
following of the thesis: RSLR; we showed its properties and so we have a calculus for
probabilistic polynomial time computation that is perfect to model cryptographic
primitives, protocol and potential adversaries. Now we are interested in observing
relations between terms of RSLR, in particular we want to find out a method that
proves the impossibility to observe differences between two terms.
So, we start from the following chapter, where we will talk about equivalence of
terms in RSLR and how to prove them in way easier than the quantification over all
possible observers.
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Chapter 4
Equivalences
In the previous chapter we described a calculus to probabilistic polynomial time
computation, RSLR; in this section we introduce different methods to compare pro-
grams written in RSLR, in particular we observe when we can say that to terms are
equivalent.
Why is this important? As we have seen in the introduction studying if two
programs are equivalent or not is a key point in security game-based proof, indeed
equivalence can be used to justify transitions from a game to another one. Intuitively,
we can say that two programs are equivalent if no one can distinguish between them
by observing their external visible behavior; a formalization of this intuition is given
by proposing the concept of context. A contexts is defined by taking the syntax of
terms and allowing one or more subterms to be a special variable rs that is called
hole.
In this thesis we will focus our attention on contexts with at most one hole, we
will work particularly on linear contexts, that are contexts in which the hole lies
outside the scope of any recursion operator; once defined the syntax of contexts we
will give a definition of context equivalence and then we will propose two different
methods that characterize it.
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The first method is based on traces; we will define how a term evolves by perform-
ing a trace and then we will observe the differences between two terms performing
the same trace. Even if this method does not solve the problem of a universal quan-
tification, it allows us to work with traces that have a structure which is simpler
than contexts.
The second method is based on a coinductive approach; we will define a labeled
transition system by using a Markov chain and then we will define a binary relation
called applicative bisimulation on it. The strong point of this method is that we
don’t have a universal quantification, furthermore this is a method that is sound
w.r.t. all contexts, even if they are not linear; the weak point is that this method is
sound but not complete as we will see later.
4.1 Linear Contexts
Definition 6 A context is a term with a unique hole, defined by the following gram-
mar:
C :: t | rs | λx.C | Ct | tC | 0pCq | 1pCq | tailpCq
| caseApC, t, t, tq | caseApt, C, C, Cq | recApC, t, t, tq.
As we said before we focus our attention on linear contexts, indeed in order to
get a nonlinear context we have to extend the grammar above with the constructs
recApt, C, t, tq, recApt, t, C, tq, recApt, t, t, Cq, but, at the moment, this is not our inter-
est.
The purpose of contexts is to test terms and to find some difference between
them, so, given a term t we define Crts as the RSLR term we obtain by substituting
all the occurrences of rs, if any, with t. We consider only contexts that are non-
binding, it means that they can be filled only by closed terms, so, in order to be
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more precise we give a typing system for contexts as happens as for terms, by the
rules showed in figure 4.1. A judgment of the form Γ $ Cr$ As : B means that C
Γ $ t : A
Γ $ trHs : A $ r$ As : A
Γ $ Cr$ As : Str
Γ $ 0pCr$ Asq, 1pCr$ Asq, tailpCr$ Asq : Str
x : bB,Γ $ Cr$ As : C
Γ $ λx.Cr$ As : bBÑ C
Γ; ∆1 $ Cr$ As : bBÑ C
Γ; ∆2 $ t : B Γ,∆2  : b
Γ; ∆1,∆2 $ Ctr$ As : C
Γ; ∆1 $ t : bBÑ C
Γ; ∆2 $ Cr$ As : B Γ,∆2  : b
Γ; ∆1,∆2 $ tCr$ As : C
Γ; ∆1 $ Cr$ As : Str Γ; Γ3 $ t1 : B
Γ; ∆2 $ t0 : B Γ; ∆4 $ t : B
Γ; ∆1,∆2,∆3,∆4 $ caseBpC, t0, t1, tqr$ As : B
Γ; ∆1 $ t : Str Γ; ∆3 $ C1r$ As : B
Γ; ∆2 $ C0r$ As : B Γ; ∆4 $ Cr$ As : B
Γ; ∆1,∆2,∆3,∆4 $ caseBpt, C0, C1, Cqr$ As : B
Γ1; ∆1 $ Cr$ As : Str Γ1,Γ2; Γ3; ∆2 $ t : B
Γ1,Γ2 $ t0 : Str Ñ BÑ B Γ1,∆1  : 
Γ1,Γ3 $ t1 : Str Ñ BÑ B B  -free
Γ1,Γ2,Γ3; ∆1,∆2 $ recBpC, t0, t1, tqr$ As : B
Figure 4.1: Context Typing Rules
must be filled only by a term of type A and, given t P TA we have Crts P TBΓ.
Now that the notion of a context is properly defined, we can give one of the
central notions of this thesis, the definition of context equivalence.
Definition 7 (Context Equivalence) Given two terms t, s such that $ t, s : A,
we say that t and s are context equivalent iff for every context C such that $ Cr$
As : Str we have that: JCrtsKpq  JCrssKpq
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What we are intuitively doing is taking all contexts and saying that two terms are
context equivalent if the probability that they return the empty string when filled
with the first one is the same than when they are filled with the second one; notice
that it is not restrictive to observe only the empty string as output, because we are
quantifying over all the contexts. Indeed if we suppose there exists a context C such
that JCrtsKpmq  JCrssKpmq for a certain string m, then we can immediately build
a context C 1 such that JC 1rtsKpq  JC 1rssKpq. By using some syntactic sugar we
have:
C 1rs : if pCrs  mq then  else 0
and so: JC 1rtsKpq  JCrtsKpmq  JCrssKpmq  JC 1rssKpq
As we said before, it is obvious that a quantification over all contexts, even if only
linear, requires an huge amount of resources, so we need to find a simpler method
to prove this kind of equivalence.
4.2 Traces
The first method we propose to characterize context equivalence is based on traces,
so first of all we give a definition of trace.
Definition 8 A trace is a sequence of actions of the form a1  a2    an such that
ai P tpasspvq, viewpmq | v P V,m P VStru. Traces are indicated with metavariables
like T, S.
Given a term t : A, what a trace intuitively does is to pass a value if the term is
a function or to observe it if the term is a string; for this reason we give a notion of
compatibility of a trace with a type.
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Definition 9 The compatibility of a trace T with a type A (we write T : A) is
defined inductively on the structure of A. The empty trace  is compatible with
every type; if A  Str then T  viewpmq, with m P VStr, or T  , otherwise, if
A  bB Ñ C then traces compatible with A are in the form T  passpvq  S with
v P VB and S is itself compatible with C.
With a slight abuse of notation, we often assume traces to be compatible to the
underlying type; furthermore we say that a trace is complete if it ends with the
action viewpq or incomplete otherwise.
But, what does it mean for a term t to perform a compatible trace T? By the
probabilistic nature of our calculus we know that a term evolves to a distribution of
values, so when a trace passes a value or observes a string what it is actually doing is
passing a value to a distribution of functions or observing a distribution of strings.
By these reasons we think that it is more convenient to work directly with term
distributions, i.e. distributions whose support is a set of closed term of a certain
type A. We denote term distributions with metavariables like T, S and we formalize
the effect that traces have on term distributions by introducing the following binary
relations:
• The first relation is defined between term distributions and is called V; intu-
itively T V S iff T evolves to S by performing some internal moves.
• The second relation is defined between term distributions and is called ñ; it
models internal and external moves.
• Finally we define a third relation ÞÑ between term distributions and real num-
bers, it captures the probability of a term distribution to accept a certain trace.
Furthermore we will sometimes use the relation Ñ to indicate a single internal or
external move. These three relations are defined inductively by the rules in figure
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T ñ T
T ñS tpλx.tiq
piu
T ñSpasspvq tptitv{xuq
piu
T ñS S SV U
T ñS U
T ñS tpmiq
piu
T ÞÑSviewpmq
°
mim
pi
tÑ tptiq
piu
T   tptqpuV T   tptiqppiu
Figure 4.2: Binary Relations Rules
4.2.
The following gives basic, easy, results about the relations we have introduced:
Lemma 4.1 Let T be a term distribution for the type A. Then, there is a unique
value distribution D such that T V D. As a consequence, for every trace T com-
patible for A there is a unique real number p such that T ÞÑT p. This real number is
denoted as PrpT,Tq.
Proof:
• Suppose that T is normal, i.e. all elements in the support are values, then we
have T  D and then the thesis.
• If T is not normal then there exists a set of indexes J such that tptjqpjujPJ  T
aren’t values. We know by a previous lemma that for all j P J there exists a
unique Dj, value distribution, such that tj ó Dj in a finite number of steps.
So, if we set D  Tztptjq
pjujPJ  
°
jPJ pj Dj we have T V D with D normal
and we can say that for all T there exists T1 normal such that T ñ T1.
For example if we consider T  tpcaseStrprand, 0, 1, qq
1
2 , p0q
1
2 u we have that
caseStrprand, 0, 1, q is not a value, but we know:
caseStrprand, 0, 1, q ó tp0q
1
2 , p1q
1
2 u
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so if we set
D  tp0q
1
2 u  
1
2
 tp0q
1
2 , p1q
1
2 u  tp0q
3
4 , p1q
1
4 u
we have T V D, with D value distribution.
• Given T  S  passpvq we have by induction hypothesis that T ñS tpλx.tiqpiu.
Then, by performing the action passpvq we have T ñSpasspvq tptitv{xuq
piu, but,
by applying the previous point there exists T1 normal such that tptitv{xuq
piuV
T1 and then by the binary relations rules we have T ñSpasspvq T1 normal distri-
bution.
• Suppose now that T  S  viewpmq then we have by induction hypothesis
T ñS T1  tpmiq
piu with T1 unique; so, if we perform the action viewpmq we
have T ÞÑSviewpmq p 
°
i;mim
pi, that is unique by construction.
l
Now that we have defined the meaning of a term distribution to perform a trace
we are able to give the definition of trace equivalence.
Definition 10 Given two term distributions T, S we say that they are trace equiv-
alent (and we write T T S) if, for all traces T it holds that:
PrpT,Tq  PrpS,Tq
In particular, then, two terms t, s are trace equivalent when tt1u T ts1u and we
write t T s in that case.
It is easy to prove that T is an equivalence relation.
Proposition 4.1 Trace equivalence is an equivalence relation.
Proof: We have to prove that trace equivalence is reflexive, symmetric and transi-
tive.
4.2. TRACES
• T is Reflexive:
For all T we have PrpT,Tq  p and p is unique. So for all T compatible,
PrpT,Tq  PrpT,Tq and then T T T.
• T is Symmetric:
For all T, S, if T T S for all T compatible, PrpT,Tq  PrpS,Tq, then
PrpS,Tq  PrpT,Tq and so S T T.
• T is Transitive:
For all T, S,U if T T S, S T U then for all compatible traces T we have
PrpT,Tq  PrpS,Tq and PrpS,Tq  PrpU,Tq. But this means PrpT,Tq 
PrpU,Tq and so T T U
l
We list now some of the properties of trace equivalence, that will be useful in
the following.
Lemma 4.2 Given two term distributions T, S such that T T S then we have:
1. If T V T1 then T1 T S.
2. If T Ñpasspvq T1 and SÑpasspvq S1 then T1 T S1
Proof:
1. If T V T1 then by the binary relations rules we have T ñ T1. But, for all
traces T we have that PrpT,Tq  PrpT,   Tq, this means:
PrpT,Tq  PrpT,   Tq  PrpT1,Tq
and so we have that if PV P1 then for all traces T:
PrpT1,Tq  PrpT,Tq  PrpS,Tq
and so T1 T S.
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2. This point comes by the fact that we quantify over a smaller set of traces.
Indeed if we suppose by contradiction that T1, S1 are not trace equivalent then
there exists a trace T such that PrpT1,Tq  PrpS1,Tq, but if this is true then:
PrpT, passpvq  Tq  1  PrpT1,Tq  1  PrpS1,Tq  PrpS, passpvq  Tq
so we have that T, S are not trace equivalent and then a contradiction.
l
4.3 Full Abstraction
As we have seen, it is easy to prove that trace equivalence is an equivalence relation.
The next step, then, is to prove that trace equivalence is compatible, thus paving the
way to a proof of soundness w.r.t. context equivalence. Unfortunately, the direct
proof of compatibility (i.e., an induction on the structure of contexts) simply does
not work: this happens because the operational semantics we defined does not allow
to observe how a term behaves in a context and so we have a lack of information
that makes the proof impossible. Following [19], we proceed by considering a refined
semantics, defined not on terms but on pairs whose first component is a context and
whose second component is a term distribution.
Definition 11 A context pair is a pair of the form pC,Tq, where the first term is
a context Cr$ As : B and the second is a term distribution such that all terms are
of type A. We define a (context) pair distribution P  tpCi,Tiq
piu as a distribution
over context pairs such that for all i we have $ Cir$ As : B and Ti : A.
We say that a pair distribution P  tpCi,Tiq
piuis normal if for all i and for all
t P SpTiq we have that Cirts is a value.
The purpose of using this approach based on pairs is to separate the reduction
of the contexts and the evolution of the term distributions in order to observe that
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the trace equivalence is preserved; by this reason we will observe how a pair pC,Tq
evolves following a trace step-by-step, and so we give a one-step semantics, defined
by the rules in figure 4.3. and a small-step semantics, by the rules in figure 4.4.
The following tells us that working with context pairs is the same as working
with terms as far as traces are concerned:
Lemma 4.3 Given a context C and a term distribution T if CrTs Ñ tpCirTisq
piu
then pC,Tq Ñ tpCi,Tiq
piu
Proof: The proof is given by observing the possible reductions.
• Suppose C to be term t, so we have CrTs  t. If it reduces t Ñ tptiqpiu, then
we have by the one step rules pt,Tq Ñ tpti,Tq
piu.
• If C  rs then CrTs  T so if T reduces, we have T Ñ T1, By the one step
rules we have prs,Tq Ñ tprs,T1q1u.
• If the context is in the form Cv, we have that if C  λx.C 1 then
CrTsv Ñ tpC 1tv{xurTsq1u
Similarly:
pCv,Tq Ñ tpC 1tv{xu,Tq1u
Otherwise if C  rs then:
rTsv Ñ tpT1q1u
but, similarly:
prsv,Tq Ñ tprs,T1q1u
• The other cases are similar, a simple application of the one step rules.
l
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T Ñpasspvq T1
prs,Tq Ñpasspvq tprs,T1q1u pλx.C,Tq Ñ
passpvq tpCtv{xu,Tq1u
pm,Tq ÞÑviewpmq 1 pm1,Tq ÞÑviewpmq 0
T  tpmjq
pju
prs,Tq Ñ tpmj ,Tjq
pju
pC,Tq Ñ tpCi,Tiq
piu
p0pCq,Tq Ñ tp0pCiq,Tiq
piu
pC,Tq Ñ tpCi,Tiq
piu
p1pCq,Tq Ñ tp1pCiq,Tiq
piu
pC,Tq Ñ tpCi,Tiq
piu
ptailpCq,Tq Ñ tptailpCiq,Tiq
piu
tÑ tptiq
piu
pt,Tq Ñ tpti,Tiq
piu
T Ñ T1
prs,Tq Ñ tprs,T1q1u
pC,Tq Ñpasspvq tpC 1,T1q1u
pCv,Tq Ñ tpC 1,T1q1u
pC,Tq Ñ tpCi,Tiq
piu
pCt,Tq Ñ tpCit,Tiq
piu
tÑ tptiq
piu Crvs value, @v P SpTq
pCt,Tq Ñ tpCti,Tiq
piu
pC,Tq Ñ tpCi,Tiq
piu
pvC,Tq Ñ tpvCi,Tiq
piu
tÑ tptiq
piu
ptC,Tq Ñ tptiC,Tiq
piu
ppλx.Cqv,Tq Ñ tpCtv{xu,Tq1u
pC,Tq P V
ppλx.tqC,Tq Ñ tpttC{xu,Tq1u
tÑ tptiq
piu
pcaseApt, C0, C1, Cq,Tq Ñ tpcaseApti, C0, C1, Cq,Tiq
piu
(C,Tq Ñ tpCi,Tiq
piu
pcaseApC, t0, t1, tq,Tq Ñ tpcaseApCi, t0, t1, tq,Tiq
piu
pcaseAp0m, C0, C1, Cq,Tq Ñ tpC0,Tq
1u pcaseAp1m, C0, C1, Cq,Tq Ñ tpC1,Tq
1u
pcaseAp, C0, C1, Cq,Tq Ñ tpC,Tq
1u
pC,Tq Ñ tpCi,Tiq
piu
precApC, t0, t1, tq,Tq Ñ tprecApCi, t0, t1, tqq
pi ,Tiq
piu
Figure 4.3: Context Pairs: One-Step Semantics
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Pñ P
PñS P1 P1 V P2
PñS P2
PñS tpCi,Tiq
piu pCi,Tiq Ñ
passpvq tpC 1i,T
1
iq
1u
PñSpasspvq tpC 1i,T
1
iq
piu
PñS tpmi,Tiq
piu
P ÞÑSviewpmq
°
i;mim
pi
pC,Tq Ñ tpCi,Tiq
piu
P  tpC,TqpuV P  tpCi,Tiqppiu
Figure 4.4: Small-Step Rules
Lemma 4.4 Suppose given a context C, a term distribution T, and a trace S. Then
if pC,Tq ñS tpCi,Tiq
piu then CrTs ñS tpCirTisq
piu. Moreover, if pC,Tq ÞÑS p, then
PrpCrTs, Sq  p.
Proof:
• If S  , we know that if CrTs ñ tpCirTisqpiu also pC,Tq ñ tpCi,Tiqpiu
because the correspondence is preserved by internal reductions.
• If S  S1  passpvq then we have CrTs ñS1 tpCirTisqpiu and, by induction
hypothesis pC,Tq ñS
1
tpCi,Tiq
piu. For all i, if Ci  rs then
CirTs  Ti Ñ
passpvq tpT1iq
1u
but, similarly:
pCi,Tiq  prs,Tiq Ñ
passpvq tprs,T1iqu
Otherwise, if CirTis  λx.C
1
irTis then
λx.C 1irTis Ñ
passpvq tC 1itv{xurTis
1u
Similarly:
pλx.C 1i,Tiq Ñ
passpvq tpC 1itv{xu,Tiq
1u
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and so the thesis.
• If S  S1  viewpmq with S1 incomplete trace, by the previous point we have
that CrTs ñS
1
tpmiq
piu and pC,Tq ñS
1
tpmi,Tiq
piu. So we have
PrpC, Sq 
¸
pi  pmirTis ÞÑ
viewpmqq 
¸
pi 
1, if mi  m;
0, if mi  m;


¸
pi  ppmi,Tiq ÞÑ
viewpmqq  pC,Tq ÞÑS
l
But how could we exploit context pairs for our purposes? The key idea can be
informally explained as follows: there is a notion of “relatedness” for pair distri-
butions which not only is stricter than trace equivalence, but can be proved to be
preserved along reduction, even when interaction with the environment is taken into
account.
Definition 12 (Trace Relatedness) Let P,Q be two pair distributions. We say
that they are trace-related, and we write POQ if there exist families tCiuiPI , tTiuiPI ,
tSiuiPI , and tpiuiPI such that P  tpCi,Tiq
piu,Q  tpCi, Siq
piu and for every i P I, it
holds that Ti 
T Si.
The first observation about trace relatedness has to do with stability with respect
to internal reduction; before going into the details of the proof we observe the
different cases in which a couple pC,Tq reduces to a distribution tpCi,Tiq
piu.
In the following we analyze the four situations in which a couple reduces and the
basic cases.
1. Term Distribution Reduction
This is the case in which we have a reduction inside the hole without interaction
between the term distribution and the context, that is the case in which the
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derivation starts from the premise T Ñ T1:
T Ñ T1
prs,Tq Ñ tprs,T1q1u
T Ñ T1
pvrs,Tq Ñ tpvrs,T1q1u
T Ñ T1
prst,Tq Ñ tprst,T1q1u
T Ñ T1
pcaseAprs, t0, t1, tq,Tq Ñ tpcaseAprs, t0, t1, tq,T
1q1u
T Ñ T1
precAprs, t0, t1, tq,Tq Ñ tprecAprs, t0, t1, tq,T
1q1u
2. Mixed Reduction
This is the case in which the context passes some value v to the term distri-
bution. These derivations start from the premise T Ñpasspvq T1.
T Ñpasspvq T1
prsv,Tq Ñ tprs,T1q1u
T Ñpasspvq T1
pcaseAprsv, t0, t1, tq,Tq Ñ tpcaseAprs, t0, t1, tq,T
1q1u
T Ñpasspvq T1
precAprsv, t0, t1, tq,Tq Ñ tprecAprs, t0, t1, tq,T
1q1u
3. Reduction Without Observation
This is the case in which the context reduces without interacting with the term
distribution. These reductions starts from the premise tÑ ttpii u.
tÑ ttpii u
pt,Tq Ñ tpti,Tq
piu
tÑ ttpii u
ptC,Tq Ñ tptiC,Tq
piu
tÑ ttpii u C is a value
pCt,Tq Ñ tpCti,Tq
piu
tÑ ttpii u
pcaseApt, C0, C1, Cq,Tq Ñ tpcaseApti, C0, C1, Cq,Tq
piu
4. Reduction with Observation
This is the case in which the term distribution is a string distribution and so
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the context is allowed to observe it. These reductions start from the premise
T  tm
pj
j u.
T  tm
pj
j u
prs,Tq Ñ tpmj,Tq
pju
T  tm
pj
j u
p0prsq,Tq Ñ tp0pmjq,Tq
pju
T  tm
pj
j u
p1prsq,Tq Ñ tp1pmjq,Tq
pju
T  tm
pj
j u
ptailprsq,Tq Ñ tptailpmjq,Tq
pju
T  tm
pj
j u
pλx.trs,Tq Ñ tpλx.t mj,Tq
pju
T  tm
pj
j u
pcaseAprs, t0, t1, tq,Tq Ñ tpcaseApmj, t0, t1, tq,Tq
pju
T  tm
pj
j u
precAprs, t0, t1, tq,Tq Ñ tprecApmj, t0, t1, tq,Tq
pju
Notice that, after the observation, the context becomes a family of simple
terms.
Now we can go into details and prove that relatedness between two pair distri-
butions is preserved by internal reductions.
Lemma 4.5 (Internal Stability) Let P,Q two pair distributions such that POQ,
then if PV P1 there exists Q1 such that Qñ Q1 and P1OQ1.
Proof: Let’s see all the possible reductions of a pair distribution P
1. Term distribution reduction, pC,Tq Ñ tpC,T1q1u.
By definition we know that, given pC,Tqp P P, there exists pC, Sqp P Q such
that T T S. Then by the trace equivalence properties we know T1 T S, so
we have:
PV P1  PztpC,Tqpu Y tpC,T1qpu
and obviously P1OQ
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2. Mixed Reduction pC,Tq Ñ tpC 1,T1q1u
This is the case in which the context passes a value to the hole, then we have
a transition with probability 1. Suppose P Q pC,Tqp Ñ tpC 1,T1qpu then there
exists Q Q pC, Sqp Ñ tpC 1, S1qpu, because the context are the same by definition
and T1 T S1 by the trace equivalence properties. Then we have:
PV P1  PztpC,Tqpu Y tpC 1,T1qpu
QV Q1  QztpC, Sqpu Y tpC 1, S1qpu
with P1OQ1.
3. Reduction without observation pC,Tq Ñ tpCi,Tq
piu.
By definition we know that there exists pC, Sqp P Q that reduces the same way,
so we have:
PV P1  PztpC,Tqpu Y tpCi,Tqppiu
QV Q1  QztpC, Sqpu Y tpCi, Sqppiu
and obviously P1OQ1.
4. Observation Reduction pC,Tq Ñ tptj,Tq
pju.
Suppose that T  tpmjq
pju, then we can also suppose that S  tm
qj
j u and
T T S (Otherwise we have S Ñ S1  tm
qj
j u with T 
T S1 by the trace
equivalence properties). Then we have:
PV PztpC,Tqpu Y tptj,Tjqppju
QV QztpC, Sqpu Y tptj, Sjqpqju
but T T S so we have pj  qj for all j and so the thesis.
l
Once Internal Stability is proved, and since the relation V can be proved to be
strongly normalizing also for context pair distributions, one gets that:
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Lemma 4.6 (Bisimulation, Internally) If P,Q are pair distributions, with POQ
then there are P1,Q1 normal distributions such that Pñ P1, Qñ Q1 and P1OQ1.
Proof: The proof comes from the fact that, given P if it is not normal, there is P1
normal such that P V P1, and by the previous lemma we have P1OQ. Then if Q
isn’t normal we can repeat the procedure and get Q1 such that QV Q1 and P1OQ1.
l
The next step consists in proving that context pair distributions which are trace
related are not only bisimilar as for internal reduction, but also for external reduc-
tion:
Lemma 4.7 (Bisimulation, Externally) Given two pair distributions P,Q with
POQ, then for all traces S we have:
1. If P ñS R, with R normal distribution, then Q ñS W, where ROW and W is a
normal distribution too.
2. If P ÞÑS p and Q ÞÑS q then p  q.
Proof: We act by induction on the length of S.
• If S   then by lemma 4.6 we get the thesis. Suppose now S  S1 passpvq then
we have by induction hypothesis: PñS
1
tpCi,Tiq
piuiPI and Qñ
S1 tpCi, Siq
piuiPI
with Ti 
T Si for all i P I and the two pair distributions normal. But, by the
one-step rules we have only two possible derivations for an action passpvq:
pλx.C,Tq Ñpasspvq tpCtv{xu,Tq1u
T Ñpasspvq T1
prs,Tq Ñpasspvq tprs,T1q1u
So if we set J  tj P I | Cj  λx.C
1
ju, K  tk P I | Ci  rsu we have:
PñS
1
tpλx.C 1j,Tjq
pju   tprs,Tkq
pku QñS
1
tpλx.C 1j, Sjq
pju   tprs, Skq
pku
At this point, if Tk Ñ
passpvq T1k and Sk Ñ
passpvq S1k we know T
1
k 
T S1k for all k,
so by using the one step rule we set:
P1  tpCjtv{xu,Tjq
pju   tprs,T1kq
pku Q1  tpCjtv{xu, Sjq
pju   tprs, S1kq
pku
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and we have P ñS
1passpvq P1, Q ñSpasspvq Q1 with P2OQ2; and so by applying
lemma 4.6 we get the (1) thesis.
• Suppose now S  S1  viewpmq.
By induction we know that PñS
1
tpmi,Tiq
piu,QñS
1
tpmi, Siq
piu with Ti 
T Si
for all i P I and that the two pair distributions are normal. So we know:
PñS
1
tpmj,Tjq
pju QñS
1
tpmj, Sjq
pju
So we have:
P ÞÑS
1viewpmq p 
¸
mjm
pj Q ÞÑ
S1viewpmq q 
¸
mjm
pj
and so p  q
l
Lemma 4.8 Given two term distributions T, S such that T T S, then for all con-
texts C, for all traces S we have: PrpCrTs, Sq  PrpCrSs, Sq
Proof:
• If the trace S doesn’t end with the action viewpq then PrpCrTs, Sq  1 
PrpCrSs, Sq.
• Otherwise we know that pC,Tq ÞÑS p, we can write PrppC,Tq, Sq  p, and by
Lemma 4.7 we know pC, Sq ÞÑS p. But by Lemma 4.4 we know PrpCrTs, Sq 
PrppC,Tq, Sq  PrppC, Sq, Sq  PrpCrSs, Sq and then the thesis.
l
We are now in a position to prove the main result of this section:
4.4. TYPED RELATIONS AND APPLICATIVE BISIMULATION
Theorem 4.1 Trace equivalence is a congruence.
Proof: We have to prove that, given two terms t, s such that t T s then for all
contexts C, we have that Crts T Crss, i.e., for all traces S we have PrpCrts, Sq 
PrpCrss, Sq. But by Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.7 we have, indeed, that PrpCrts, Sq 
PrppC, tt1uq, Sq  PrppC, ts1u, Sq  PrpCrss, Sq, because the two pair distributions
tpC, tt1uq1u and tppC, ts1uqq1u are trace-related. l
Corollary 4.1 (Soundness) Trace equivalence is included into context equivalence.
Proof: If t T s, then by the previous theorem we have that for all contexts C
we have Crts T Crss and this means that if we choose a trace T  viewpq then
we have JCrtsKpq  PrpCrts, viewpqq  PrpCrss, viewpqq  JCrssKpq, and so the
thesis. l
Theorem 4.2 (Full Abstraction) Context equivalence coincides with trace equiv-
alence
Proof: For any admissible trace T for A, there is a context CTrs such that Prpt,Tq JCTrtsKpq, which can be proved by induction on the structure of A. l
4.4 Typed Relations and Applicative Bisimula-
tion
As we already discussed, the quantification over all contexts makes the task of prov-
ing two terms to be context equivalent burdensome, even if we restrict to linear
contexts and we cannot say that trace equivalence really overcomes this problem:
there is a universal quantification anyway, even if contexts are replaced by objects
(i.e. traces) having a simpler structure. It is thus natural to look for other tech-
niques. The interactive view provided by traces suggests the possibility to go for
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coinductive techniques akin to Abramsky’s applicative bisimulation, which has al-
ready been shown to be adaptable to probabilistic λ-calculi [30, 17].
Applicative bisimulation is a typed relation defined on a Labeled Transition
System, so in this section we will start by introducing the concept of typed relation
and some useful propertis, then we will present the Labeled Transition System on
which we define the applicative bisimulation and we will show that it is a sound
method to prove that two terms are context equivalent (even if the context is not
linear), but not complete.
Definition 13 We define a typed relation R as a family R  tRAΓuΓ,A, where each
relation RAΓ is a binary relation on T
A
Γ.
Given two terms t, s P TAΓ we write Γ $ t R s : A to say that they are in relation
RAΓ.
Definition 14 Let R be a typed relation, we say that R is:
• Reflexive: If for all t P TAΓ we have Γ $ t R t : A.
• Symmetric: If Γ $ t R s : A implies Γ $ s R t : A.
• Transitive: If Γ $ t R s : A and Γ $ s R r : A imply Γ $ t R r : A
The other concept which plays a key role in typed relations and then in this work
is compatibility.
Definition 15 We define a typed relation R compatible if it satisfies the the fol-
lowing conditions:
1. For all x : aA P Γ:
Γ $ x R x : aA
2. For all t, s, x
Γ, x : aA $ t R s : B ñ Γ $ λx.t R λx.s : aAÑ B
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3. For all t1, t2, s1, s2:
Γ; ∆1 $ t1 R t2 : aAÑ B ^ Γ; ∆2 $ s1 R s2 : A ñ
ñ Γ; ∆1,∆2 $ t1s1 R t2s2 : B
4. For all t, t0, t1, tε, s, s0, s1, sε:
Γ; ∆ $ t R s : Str ^ Γ; ∆0 $ t0 R s0 : A
Γ; ∆1 $ t1 R s1 : A ^ Γ; ∆ε $ tε R sε : A ñ
ñ Γ; ∆,∆0,∆1,∆ε $ caseApt, t0, t1, tεq R caseApt, t0, t1, tεq
5. For all t, t0, t1, tε, s, s0, s1, sε:
Γ1; ∆1 $ t R s : Str ^ Γ1,Γ2 $ t0 R s0 : StrÑ AÑ A ^
Γ1,Γ3 $ t1 R s1 : StrÑ AÑ A ^ Γ1,Γ2,Γ3; ∆2 $ tε R sε : A ñ
ñ Γ1,Γ2,Γ3; ∆1,∆2 $ recApt, t0, t1, tεq R recApt, t0, t1, tεq
A relation R is said a precongruence relation if it is transitive and compatible; if a
precongruence relation is symmetric we call it a congruence relation.
Another important concept when we talk about binary relations is the open
extension of a relation R; in order to define it we need to introduce the Γ-closure of
a term.
Definition 16 Given a typing context Γ  x1 : a1A1, ..., xn : anAn, we call a map
ξ : txiui1,...,n Ñ tV
Aiui1,...,n that assigns a value vi P V
Ai to each variable xi a
Γ-closure.
Given a term t such that Γ $ t : A then we write tξ to indicate the term obtained by
subsitituting the free varibles of t by the Γ-closure ξ.
Definition 17 If R is a typed binary relation, we define the open extension R, by
saying that two terms t, s, such that Γ $ t, s : A are in relation R, we write t R s,
iff for all Γ-closures ξ we have $ tξ R sξ : A.
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As we said before, applicative bisimulation is defined on a Labeled Transition
System, so now we introduce the LTS we choose: the Labeled Markov Chain.
Definition 18 We define a Labeled Markov Chain as a triple M  pS, L,Pq where:
• S  tpt,Aq | t P TAu  tpv,Aq | v P VAu is the set of states and it is composed
by the disjoint union of the set of terms and values coupled with their type.
• L  teval, passpq, viewpqu is the set of labels. The labels passpq, viewpq rep-
resent the same concept we used in traces, the eval label is the evaluation of
a term to a value (It will be more clear when we will define the probability
measure P).
• P : pS,AqLpS,Aq Ñ Rr0,1s is a probability measure; it returns the probability
to pass from a state of the Markov chain to another by a certain label. It is
defined as follows:
Pppt,Aq, eval, pv,Aqq  JtKpvq
Pppλx.t, aAÑ Bq, passpvq, pttv{xu,Bqq  1
Pppm, Strq, viewpmq, pm, Strqq  1
Pppm, Strq, viewpmq1, pm, Strqq  0
Now we are able to give the definition of applicative bisimulation.
Definition 19 Given a Labeled Markov Chain M  pS, L,Pq a probabilistic ap-
plicative bisimulation is an equivalence relation R between the states of the Markov
Chain such that, given two states t, s we have t R s : A if and only if for each
equivalence class E modulo R we have:
Pppt,Aq, l, Eq  Ppps,Aq, l, Eq
We say that two terms are bisimilar if there exists a bisimulation between them.
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We give an alternative definition of applicative bisimulation which is equivalent
to the previous one but it will be more useful in the congruence proof.
Definition 20 A probabilistic applicative bisimulation is defined to be any type-
indexed family of relations tRAuAPA such that for each A, RA is an equivalence rela-
tion over the set of closed terms of type A, and moreover the following holds:
• If t RA s, then for every equivalence class E modulo the relation RA, it holds
that JtKpEq  JsKpEq, where JtKpEq  °vPEJtKpvq.
• If pλx.tq RaAÑB pλx.sq, then for every closed value v of type A, it holds that
pttv{xuq RB pstv{xuq.
• If m RStr n, then m  n.
It is possible to prove that the greatest applicative bisimulation exists [30, 17],
it consists of the union (at any type) of all bisimulation relations and it is denoted
with . We call  (applicative)bisimilarity and we can generalize it to a relation
 on open terms by the usual open extension.
How do we prove that bisimilarity is included in context equivalence? We prove
that  is a congruence by using the so called Howe’s method, a general way for
establishing congruence properties of a relation. Given a binary relation R, Howe’s
method consists in defining a lifting of this relation RH , which is easy to prove that
is compatible; it is simple to see that R  RH so, by showing that RH  R we will
prove that R  RH and so if RH is a congruence also R is.
Definition 21 We define Howe’s lifting H of the bisimilarity  by the rules in
the following:
m  t
m H t
x  t
x H t
t H s λx.s  r
λx.t H r
t1 
H
 s1
t2 
H
 s2 s1s2  r
t1t2 
H
 r
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t H s
t0 
H
 s0 t 
H
 s
t1 
H
 s1 caseAps, s0, s1, sq  r
caseApt, t0, t1, tq 
H
 r
t H s
t0 
H
 s0 t 
H
 s
t1 
H
 s1 recAps, s0, s1, sq  r
recApt, t0, t1, tq 
H
 r
It is easy to prove that for every binary relation R in RSLR the following results are
valid.
Lemma 4.9 If R is reflexive, then RH is compatible. Moreover if Γ $ t R s : A
then Γ $ t RH s : A and so RH is reflexive.
Proof: This is proved by induction on the structure of t. l
Definition 22 We define pRH q
  as the transitive closure of RH by the following
rules:
t RH s
tpRH q
 s
tpRH q
 s spRH q
 r
tpRH q
 r
Proposition 4.2 If R is reflexive and compatible then also pRq  is compatible
Proof: The proof is given by induction on the derivation of pH q
 . l
So we know that  is an equivalence relation, so is reflexive and then 
H
 is com-
patible; but H is also reflexive and then p
H
 q
  is compatible. Our goal is now to
show that pH q
  , but since we defined  as the union of all bisimulations it
is sufficient to prove that pH q
  is a bisimulation to obtain that inclusion. The first
step to reach this result is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.10 (Key Lemma) Given two terms t, s, we have:
• If $ t H s : aAÑ B, then for all E P TBx:aA{H equivalence class modulo H
it holds that JtKpλx.Eq  JsKpλx.Eq.
• If $ t H s : Str, then for all m P VStr we have JtKpmq  JsKpmq.
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Proof: We work by induction on the derivation of JtK.
• Suppose t is a value. If t  m1 by Howe’s derivation rules we know that
$ m1 H s iff:
$ m1  s
$ m1 H s
that means m1  s and then for all m P V
Str,
Jm1Kpmq  JsKpmq
So the thesis. Similarly, if t  λx.t1, by Howe’s derivation rules we know:
t1 H s
1 λx.s1  s
λx.t1 H s
So, given E P TBx:aA{H we have:
Jλx.t1Kpλx.Eq 
$&
%
1, if t1 P E;
0, otherwise.

$&
%
1, if s1 P E;
0, otherwise.

Jλx.s1Kpλx.Eq  JsKpλx.Eq
• Suppose now t  caseaAÑBpt1, t10, t11, t1q, then: $ caseaAÑBpt1, t10, t11, t1q H s :
aAÑ B, which is derived from:
t1 H s
1
t10 
H
 s
1
0 t
1
 
H
 s
1

t11 
H
 s
1
1 caseaAÑBps
1, s10, s
2
1, sq  s
caseaAÑBpt
1, t10, t
1
1, t
1
q 
H
 s
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Then for all E P TBx:aA{H we have by induction hypothesis:
JtKpλx.Eq JcaseaAÑBpt1, t10, t11, t1qKpλx.Eq 
Jt1KpqJt1Kpλx.Eq  ¸
m
Jt1Kp0mqJt10KpEq  ¸
m
Jt1Kp1mqJt11KpEq 
Js1KpqJs1Kpλx.Eq  ¸
m
Js1Kp0mqJs10KpEq  ¸
m
Js1Kp1mqJs11KpEq 
JsKpλx.Eq
If t  caseStrpt
1, t10, t
1
1, t
1
q : Str the proof is similar to the previous case.
• Suppose now t  t1t2 : aA Ñ B and so we have $ t1t2 H s : aA Ñ B that is
derived from:
t1 
H
 s1
t2 
H
 s2 s1s2  r
t1t2 
H
 r
We have to face two different cases: t2 P T
Str and t2 P T
cCÑD. If t2 P T
Str then
for all E P TBx:aA{H we have:
JtKpλx.Eq Jt1t2Kpλx.Eq 

¸
m1PVStr
Jt2Kpm1q

 ¸
ErPVaAÑBy:aStr
¸
rPEr
Jt1Kpλy.rqJrtm1{yuKpλx.Eq



¸
m1PVStr
Jt2Kpm1q

 ¸
ErPVaAÑBy:aStr
Jt1Kpλy.ErqJErtm1{yuKpλx.Eq



¸
m1PVStr
Js2Kpm1q

 ¸
ErPVaAÑBy:aStr
Js1Kpλy.ErqJErtm1{yuKpλx.Eq


Js1s2Kpλx.Eq  JsKpλx.Eq
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If t2 P T
cCÑD then we have:
JtKpλx.Eq  Jt1t2Kpλx.Eq 

¸
EvPVDz:cC
¸
vPEv
Jt2Kpλz.vq

 ¸
ErPVaAÑBy:cCÑD
¸
rPEr
Jt1Kpλy.rqJrtλz.v{yuKpλx.Eq



¸
EvPVDz:cC
Jt2Kpλz.Evq

 ¸
ErPVaAÑBy:cCÑD
Jt1Kpλy.ErqJErtλz.Ev{yuKpλx.Eq



¸
EvPVDz:cC
Js2Kpλz.Evq

 ¸
ErPVaAÑBy:cCÑD
Js1Kpλy.ErqJErtλz.Ev{yuKpλx.Eq


 Js1s2Kpλx.Eq  JsKpλx.Eq
The case t  t1t2 : Str is similar to the previous one.
• Finally, if t  recaAÑBpt1, t10, t11, t1q then we have $ recaAÑBpt1, t10, t11, t1q H s
which is derived from:
t1 H s
1
t10 
H
 s0 t
1
 
H
 s
1

t11 
H
 s1 recaAÑBps
1, s10, s
1
1, s
1
q  s
recaAÑBpt
1, t10, t
1
1, t
1
q 
H
 s
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then for all E P VBx:a{H we have:
JtKpλx.Eq  JrecaAÑBpt1, t10, t11, t1qKpλx.Eq 
 Jt1KpqJtKpλx.Eq 
 
¸
mPVStr
Jt1Kp0mqJpt100mqprecaAÑBpm, t10, t11, tqqKpλx.Eq 
 
¸
mPVStr
Jt1Kp1mqJpt111mqprecaAÑBpm, t11, t11, tqqKpλx.Eq 
 Js1KpqJsKpλx.Eq 
 
¸
mPVStr
Js1Kp0mqJps100mqprecaAÑBpm, s10, s11, sqqKpλx.Eq 
 
¸
mPVStr
Js1Kp1mqJps111mqprecaAÑBpm, s11, s11, sqqKpλx.Eq 
 JsKpλx.Eq
The case t  recStrpt
1, t10, t
1
1, t
1
q is similar to the previous one.
So we have the thesis. l
Theorem 4.3 pH q
  is a bisimulation.
Proof: We work by induction on the derivation of pH q
 , proving that pH q
 
satisfies the three points of the definition above. This, in particular, relies on the
Key Lemma. l
Theorem 4.4 Bisimilarity is a congruence.
Proof: The proof comes easily from the fact that pH q
  is a congruence. Indeed it
is transitive and symmetric by definition and also compatible. By the definition of
pH q
  we have that 
H
  p
H
 q
 , but the theorem above tells us that pH q
 
is a bisimulation, and that it must be included in , the symmetric and transitive
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closure of all the bisimulations. So we have  p
H
 q
  ^ pH q
   which means
that  p
H
 q
 , and we get the thesis, namely that  is a congruence. l
As usual, being a congruence has soundness as an easy corollary:
Corollary 4.2 (Soundness) Bisimilarity is included in context equivalence.
Is there any hope to get full abstraction? The answer is negative: applicative
bisimilarity is too strong to match context equivalence. A counterexample to that
can be built easily following the analogous one from [30]. Consider the following
two terms:
t  λx.if rand then true else false
s  if rand then pλx.trueq else pλx.falseq
where we have used some easy syntactic sugar. It is easy to show that t and s are
trace equivalent, thus context equivalent. On the other hand, t and s cannot be
bisimilar. This, however, is not the end of the story on coinductive methodologies
for context equivalence in RSLR. A different route, suggested by trace equivalence,
consists in taking the naturally definable (deterministic) labeled transition system
of term distributions and ordinary bisimilarity over it. What one obtains this way
is a precise characterization of context equivalence. There is a price to pay however,
since one is forced to reason on distributions rather than terms.
Summing up, in this chapter we started to compare RSLR terms, discussing
about equivalences; we showed how we can use traces to compare terms instead of
arbitrary contexts and obtain the same results. Furthermore we propose a different
approach based on coinduction, the applicative bisimulation, which is easier, due
to the fact that eliminates the universal quantifications, but too strict; indeed we
propose an example that reveals that this method is not complete. In the following
chapter we will relax our constraints and observe a method to evaluate distances
between terms, so that we are able to say how different two terms are.
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Chapter 5
Metrics
In this section we move from equivalences to metrics. As we have seen we consider
two programs t, s equivalent when for all linear contexts C we have that the proba-
bility that Crts outputs the empty string is exactly the same of Crss; we also proved
that this is equivalent to observe the probability to perform all traces.
Actually, we can easily notice that asking exactly for the same probability is a
constraint which is too strong; in security and cryptography what we are requested
to prove is that an adversary is not able to distinguish between two program, so
this means that if the adversary is provided of a limited power of calculus it is not
necessary that two programs behave exactly in the same way, what we need is that
they are similar enough so that he can’t distinguish between them.
For this reason, in this section we generalize the concept of equivalence by defin-
ing a notion of distance between programs so that we can evaluate how far two
programs are, and this will be useful to declare how an adversary is able to separate
them. The first step will be the definition of two distances, the first one based on
contexts and the second of traces; then, in order to prove that the two distances are
the same we will show that it is necessary to make a small change on the structure
of traces, in particular we will show that it is necessary to modify the argument of
the action viewpq.
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5.1 Context and Trace Metrics
Definition 23 The context distance is a function δCA : T
ATA Ñ Rr0,1s defined for
every type A such that, given two terms t, s P TA we have:
δCpt, sq  sup
$Cr$As:Str
| JCrtsKpq  JCrssKpq |
For every type A the function δCA is a pseudometric on the space of closed terms,
indeed it is obvious that:
• δCpt, sq  0 iff t C s,
because for all C we have JCrtsKpq  JCrssKpq.
• δCpt, sq  δCps, tq,
by the property of absolute value.
• δCpt, sq ¤ δCpt, rq   δCpr, sq,
indeed we have:
δCpt, sq  sup
$Cr$As:Str
| JCrtsKpq  JCrssKpq | 
 sup
$Cr$As:Str
| JCrtsKpq  JCrrsKpq   JCrrsKpq  JCrssKpq | ¤
¤ sup
$Cr$As:Str
| JCrtsKpq  JCrrsKpq |   sup
$Cr$As:Str
| JCrrsKpq  JCrssKpq | 
δCApt, rq   δ
C
Apr, sq
With δC we refer to the family tδCAuAPA.
Now by using a similar reasoning we can give the definition of trace distance.
Definition 24 For every type A we define trace distance the function δT such that
δTA : T
A  TA Ñ Rr0,1s and, given t, s P TA:
δTApt, sq  sup
T:A
| Prpt,Tq  Prps,Tq |
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It is easy to realize that δT is a pseudometric; we have:
• δTApt, sq  0 iff t T s,
because for all T we have Prpt,Tq  Prps,Tq.
• δTpt, sq  δTps, tq,
by the property of the absolute value.
• δTpt, sq ¤ δTpt, rq   δTpr, sq.
Indeed we have:
δTpt, sq  sup
T
| Prpt,Tq  Prps,Tq | 
 sup
T
| Prpt,Tq  Prpr,Tq   Prpr,Tq  Prps,Tq | ¤
¤ sup
T
| Prpt,Tq  Prpr,Tq |   sup
T
| Prpr,Tq  Prps,Tq | 
δTApt, rq   δ
T
Apr, sq
We refer to δT to the family tδTAuAPA and now we show some properties of the
trace distance δT applied on term distributions.
Lemma 5.1 Given two term distributions T, S such that δTpT, Sq  d then we have:
1. If T V T1 then δTpT1, Sq  d.
2. If T ñpasspvq T1, Sñpasspvq S1 the we have δTpT1, S1q ¤ d
Proof:
1. If T V T1 we have by the small-step rules that T ñ T1 and then:
PrpT,Tq  PrpT,   Tq  PrpT1,Tq
so, if for all traces T we have that PrpT,Tq  PrpT1,Tq then we have the thesis,
δTpT, Sq  δTpT1, Sq.
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2. It comes from the fact that the quantification is over a smaller set of traces,
so the distance can’t be greater.
l
5.2 Full Abstraction
How do we proceed if we want to prove that trace metric coincides with context
metric? Could we proceed more or less like in the equivalences case? The answer
is positive, but we need to be careful, let’s observe the following example. Suppose
T, S be two string distributions such that:
T tp00q
1
4
d, p01q
1
4
d, p10q
1
4
 d, p11q
1
4
 du
S tp00q
1
4 , p01q
1
4 , p10q
1
4 , p11q
1
4 u
It is easy to evaluate the trace distance between T and S that is: δTpT, Sq  d, but,
what about the context distance δC?. Let’s consider the context Cr$ Strs : Str:
C : caseStrprs, , 0, 0q
We have:
JCrTsK tpq 122d, p0q 12 2du
JCrSsK tpq 12 , p0q 12 u
ando so: δCpT, Sq ¥ 2  d ¡ δTpT, Sq.
The solution is a slight change on the definition of traces, in the action viewpq
instead of observing a single trace, we need to observe a finite set of strings M. Fur-
thermore we need to find something that plays the role of compatibility, since the
latter is a property of equivalences and not of metrics ; in metrics the corresponding
of compatibility is non-expansiveness. A distance δ is said to be non-expansive iff for
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every pair of terms t, s : A we have that δpCrts, Crssq ¤ δpt, sq for every Cr$ As : B.
The way we prove δT is non-expansive is similar to the way we prove that T
is a congruence, that is by using pairs of the form pC,Tq, pC, Sq; what we need to
change is the notion of relatedness, we need to adapt it to the case of distance.
Definition 25 Given two pair distributions P,Q, we say that they are drelated,
we write POdQ, if there exist:
• tCiuiPI contexts, tTiuiPI , tSiuiPI term distributions.
• ttjujPJ terms, tTjujPJ , tSjujPJ term distributions,
• triuiPI , tpjujPJ , tqjujPJ with
¸
iPI
ri  1R,
¸
jPJ
pj 
¸
jPJ
qj  R
such that:
P  tpCi,Tiq
riuiPI Y tptj,Tjq
pjujPJ
Q  tpCi, Siq
riuiPI Y tptj, Sjq
qjujPJ
and:
δTpTi, Siq ¤ d |
¸
jPJ¯
pj  qj| ¤ R  d
For all i P I, J¯  J .
So now, the goal is to prove that this relation is preserved by internal and external
reductions.
Lemma 5.2 (Internal d-stability) Given two pair distributions P,Q with POdQ
then if there exists P1 such that P V P1 then there exists Q1 such that Q ñ Q1 or
QV Q1 and P1OdQ1.
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Proof: The pair distribution P can reduce to P1 in different ways: let’s prove the
statement for all the cases. The first two cases are simple, because they represent
transitions that happens with probability 1. The other two cases are more compli-
cated, because they involve probabilistic reductions and so we have to check that
d-relatedness is preserved evaluating the differences between the variuos probabili-
ties.
1. Term distribution reduction, pC,Tq Ñ tpC,T1q1u.
By definition we know that, given pC,Tqr P P, there exists pC, Sqr P Q such
that δTpT, Sq ¤ d. Then by the trace metric properties we know δTpT1, Sq ¤ d,
so we have:
PV P1  PztpC,Tqru Y tpC,T1qru
and obviously P1OdQ
2. Mixed Reduction pC,Tq Ñ tpC 1,T1q1u
This is the case in which the context passes a value to the hole, then we have
a transition with probability 1.
Suppose P Q pC,Tqr Ñ tpC 1,T1qru then there exists Q Q pC, Sqr Ñ tpC 1, S1qru,
because the contexts are the same by definition and δTpT1, S1q ¤ d by the trace
distance properties.
Then we have:
PV P1  PztpC,Tqru Y tpC 1,T1qru
QV Q1  QztpC, Sqru Y tpC 1, S1qru
with P1OdQ1.
3. Reduction without observation.
We have to consider two different cases: a context reduction and a term re-
duction.
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(a) Context reduction pC,Tq Ñ tpCk,Tq
rkukPK .
By definition we know that there exists pC, Sqr P Q that reduces the same
way, so we have:
PV P1  PztpC,Tqru Y tpCk,TqrrkukPK
QV Q1  QztpC, Sqru Y tpCk, SqrrkukPK
and obviously P1OdQ1.
(b) Term reduction pt,Tq Ñ tptk,Tkq
rku.
In this case we need to be careful, we have:
P  tpCi,Tiq
riuiPI Y tptj,Tjq
pjujPJ
Q  tpCi, Siq
riuiPI Y tptj, Sjq
qjujPJ
With
°
iPI ri = 1R.
Suppose that there exists j1 P J such that tj1 Ñ tptkq
rkukPK (it is the
index of the term that reduces), then, if we set J 1  Jztj1u we have:
PV P1  tpCi,TiqriuiPI Y tptj,TjqpjujPJ 1 Y tptk,Tkqpj1 rkukPK
QV Q1  tpCi, SiqriuiPI Y tptj, SjqqjujPJ 1 Y tptk, Skqqj1 rkukPK
Now, if we take J¯  J 1 YK we have:
|
¸
jPJ¯
pj  qj| |
¸
jPJ¯XJ 1
pj  qj  
¸
jPJ¯XK
pj  qj| 
|
¸
jPJ¯XJ 1
pj  qj  
¸
kPKXJ¯
pj1  rk  qj1  rk| 
|
¸
jPJ¯XJ 1
pj  qj   ppj1  qj1q 
¸
kPKXJ¯
rk| ¤
|
¸
jPJ¯XJ 1
pj  qj   ppj1  qj1q|  |
¸
jPJ¯XJ
pj  qj| ¤ R  d
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4. Observation Reduction pC,Tq Ñ tptj,Tq
pjujPJ 1 , where pj  Tpmjq.
Suppose there exists i1 P I such that Ti1  tm
pj
j ujPJ 1 .
We can also suppose that Si1  tm
qj
j ujPJ 1 (Otherwise we have Si1 Ñ
 S1i1 
tm
qj
j ujPJ 1 with δ
TpTi1 , S
1
i1q ¤ d by the trace distance properties).
So, if we set I 1  Izti1u, we have:
PV P1  tpCi,TiqriuiPI 1 Y tptj,TjqpjujPJ Y tptj,Ti1qpj ri1ujPJ 1
QV Q1  tpCi, SiqriuiPI 1 Y tptj, SjqqjujPJ Y tptj, Si1qqj ri1ujPJ 1
We know
°
iPI 1 ri  1 pR   ri1q, so, given J¯  J Y J
1 we have:
|
¸
jP{J¯
pj  qj| |
¸
jPJ¯XJ
pj  qj  
¸
jPJ¯XJ 1
ri1  pj  ri1  qj| ¤
¤d R   |ri1
¸
jPJ¯XJ 1
pj  qj| ¤ d R   d  ri1  pR   ri1q  d
because if we set M  tmjujPJ¯XJ 1 we have
|
¸
jPJ¯XJ 1
pj  qj|  |PrpTi1 , viewpMqq  PrpSi1 , viewpMqq| ¤ d
l
Lemma 5.3 (d-Relatedness, internally) Given two pair distributions P,Q with
POdQ then there exist P1,Q1 normal pair distributions with P ñ P1 and Q ñ Q1
such that P1OdQ1.
Proof: The proof comes from the fact that, given P if it is not normal, there is P1
normal such that P V P1, and by the previous lemma we have P1OdQ. Then if Q
isn’t normal we can repeat the procedure and get Q1 such that QV Q1 and P1OdQ1.
l
Lemma 5.4 (d-Relatedness, Externally) Given two pair distributions POdQ then
for every trace S:
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1. If S is incomplete then there exist P1,Q1 normal pair distributions such that
PñS Q1 and QñS Q1 with P1OdQ1.
2. If S is a complete trace then if PñS p and QñS q we have | p q| ¤ d.
Proof: We act by induction on the length of S first by proving the first case and
then the second one.
1. If S   then we get the thesis by the previous lemma.
If S  S1  passpvq then by the small-step rules we have
PñS
1
P1  tpCi,Tiq
riuiPI Y tpλx.tj,Pjq
piujPJ
QñS
1
Q1  tpCi, Siq
riuiPI Y tpλx.tj, Sjq
qjujPJ
and by induction hypothesis we have P1OdQ1.
By the small step rules we know that the action passpvq is allowed only if
C  λx.C 1 or C  rs and T  tpλx.thq
phu.
So if we set
I1  ti P I | Ci  λx.C
1
iu, I2  ti P I | Ci  rsu
by the small-step rules we have:
P1 ñpasspvq P2  tpC 1itv{xu,Tiq
riuiPI1 Y tprs,T
1
iq
riuiPI2 Y tptjtv{xu,Tjq
pjujPJ
Q1 ñpasspvq Q2  tpC 1itv{xu, Siq
riuiPI1 Y tprs, S
1
iq
riuiPI2 Y tptjtv{xu, Sjq
qjujPJ
but by a previous lemma δTpT1i, S
1
iq ¤ d so we have evidently P
2OdQ2 and by
applying the previous lemma we get the thesis.
2. If S  S1  viewpMq is a complete trace then we have by induction hypothesis
PñS
1
P1  tpmj,Tjq
pjujPJ , Qñ
S1 Q1  tpmj, Sjq
qjujPJ
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with P1OdQ1 and R  1 (Because there are no ri).
By the small-step rules we know that
P1 ÞÑviewpMq p 
¸
j;mjPM
pj Q
1 ÞÑviewpMq q 
¸
j;mjPM
qj
So if we set J¯  tj P J | mj P Muwe have:
|p q|  |
¸
jPJ¯
pj  qj| ¤ 1  d
by definition of d-relatedness
l
Now we can prove the result of non-expansiveness.
Theorem 5.1 (Non-expansiveness) Given two term distributions such that δTpT, Sq 
d then for all contexts C we have that δTpCrTs, CrSsq ¤ d.
Proof: In order to get the thesis we have to prove that for all traces S we have that
| PrpCrTs, Sq  PrpCrSs, Sq | ¤ d
• If S doesn’t end with the viewpq action then we have: | PrpCrTs, SqPrpCrSs, Sq | 
| 1 1 |  0 ¤ d
• Otherwise we have that pC,Tq ÞÑS p1  PrpCrTs, Sq and similarly pC, Sq ÞÑS
p2  PrpCrSs, Sq. But it is clear that tpC,Tq
1uOdtpC, Sq1u, and so by lemma 5.4
we have: | p1  p2 | ¤ d and then the thesis.
l
Once proved that the trace metric δT is non-expansive w.r.t. linear contexts we
can prove that the context metric δC is less or equal than δT, that is:
Theorem 5.2 For all t, s, we have: δCpt, sq ¤ δTpt, sq.
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Proof: By the previous theorem we know that, if δTpt, sq  d then for all context
C, we have δTpCrts, Crssq ¤ d; so:
δCpt, sq  sup
C
| JCrtsKpq  JCrssKpq |  sup
C
| PrpCrts, viewpqq  PrpCrss, viewpqq | ¤
¤ sup
C
δTpCrts, Crssq ¤ d
l
As a corollary of non-expansiveness, one gets that:
Theorem 5.3 (Full Abstraction) For all t, s, δTpt, sq  δCpt, sq.
Proof: δTpt, sq ¤ δCpt, sq because by the full abstraction lemma for all traces T
there exists a context CT such that JCTrtsKpq  Prpt,Tq and so the quantification
over contexts catches the quantification over traces.
The other inclusion, δCpt, sq ¤ δTpt, sq, is a consequence of non-expansiveness.
l
Summing up, in this section we propose two different notions of distance between
terms, based on context and traces, in order to evaluate how different two RSLR
terms are; we proved that these two definitions of distance actually coincide but we
had been forced to slightly modify the definition of the action viewp) on traces, and
we showed why by using a concrete example.
The results of this chapter are the basis of the following one, where we will pro-
pose a characterization of Computational Indistinguishability by a parametrization
of context and trace distance.
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Chapter 6
Computational Indistinguishability
In this section we show how our notions of equivalence and distance relate to com-
putational indistinguishability (CI in the following), a key notion in modern cryp-
tography. This is the core point of my thesis, because this characterization is the
first step towards the simplification of cryptographic proofs, by the use of adversary
in the form of traces, rather than the more complex use of a PPT algorithm A.
First of all we will give the formal definition of computational indistinguishabil-
ity then, after having observed the similarities with context distance we will give
a parametric definition of context equivalence that, in the case of terms of type
Str, coincides with CI. At this point we will offer a parametric definition of trace
equivalence that will be proved to be the same of parametric context equivalence.
6.1 Parametric Context Equivalence
Definition 26 Two distribution ensembles tDnunPN and tEnunPN (where both Dn
and En are distributions on binary strings) are said to be computationally indis-
tinguishable iff for every PPT algorithm A the following quantity is a negligible1
1A negligible function is a function which tends to 0 faster than any inverse polynomial (see [22]
for more details).
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function of n P N:
 PrxÐDnpApx, 1
nq  q  PrxÐEnpApx, 1
nq  q

It is a well-known fact in cryptography that in the definition above, A can be
assumed to sample from x just once without altering the definition itself, provided
the two involved ensembles are efficiently computable ([22], Theorem 3.2.6, page
108). This is in contrast to the case of arbitrary ensembles [23].
The careful reader should have already spotted the similarity between CI and
the notion of context distance as given in Chapter 5. There are some key differences,
though:
1. While context distance is an absolute notion of distance, CI depends on a
parameter n, the so-called security parameter.
2. In computational indistinguishability, one can compare distributions over strings,
while the context distance can evaluate how far terms of arbitrary types are.
The discrepancy Point 1 puts in evidence, however, can be easily overcome by turn-
ing the context distance into something slightly more parametric.
Definition 27 (Parametric Context Equivalence) Given two terms t, s such
that $ t, s : aStr Ñ A, we say that t and s are parametrically context equivalent,
we write t Cn s iff for every context C such that $ Cr$ As : Str we have that:
|JCrt1nsKpq  JCrs1nsKpq|
is negligible in n.
This way, we have obtained a characterization of CI:
Theorem 6.1 Let t, s be two terms of type aStr Ñ Str. Then t, s are paramet-
ric context equivalent iff the distribution ensembles tJt1nKunPN and tJs1nKunPN are
computationally indistinguishable.
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6.2 Parametric Trace Equivalence
How could traces capture the peculiar way parametric context equivalence treats
the security parameter? First of all, observe that, in Definition 27, the security
parameter is passed to the term being tested without any intervention from the
context. The most important difference, however, is that contexts are objects which
test families of terms rather than terms. As a consequence, the action viewpq does
not take strings or finite sets of strings as arguments (as in equivalences or metrics),
but rather distinguishers, namely closed RSLR terms of type aStr Ñ Str that we
denote with the metavariable D.
So now, given a term t : aStr we define the probability of t to satisfy the action
viewpDq as t ÞÑviewpDq
°
mJtKpmq  JDmKpq. Roughly speaking, the term t evaluates
to a string distribution and the observation of this distribution is performed by the
distiguisher; the probability that it outputs the empty string  is the probability that
the term t satisfies the action viewpDq. Furthermore, a trace T is said parametrically
compatible with a type A  aStrÑ B if T  passpmq  S with S : B.
Definition 28 Two terms t, s : A are parametrically trace equivalent, we write
t Tn s, iff for every trace T which is parametrically compatible with A, there is a
negligible function ε : NÑ Rr0,1s such that:
|Prpt, passp1nq  Tq  Prps, passp1nq  Tq| ¤ εpnq
The fact that parametric trace equivalence and parametric context equivalence are
strongly related is quite intuitive: they are obtained by altering in a very similar
way two notions which are already known to coincide (by Theorem 5.3). Indeed:
Theorem 6.2 Parametric trace equivalence and parametric context equivalence co-
incide.
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The first inclusion is trivial, indeed every trace can be easily emulated by a context.
The other one, as usual is more difficult, and requires a careful analysis of the be-
havior of terms depending on parameter, when put in a context. Overall, however,
the structure of the proof is similar to the one we presented in Chapter 4.
The first change comes from the fact that the behavior of the terms we want
to analyze depends on the security parameter, so basically we will not test a term
distribution as in the equivalence and metric, but a we will work with a family of
term distribution. This means that, if we want to compare two term t, s : aStrÑ A
what we did before was to consider the term distributions T  tptq1u, S  tpsq1u,
what we do now is to consider two families that we call parametric term distributions
T¯  tTnunPN, S¯  tS
nunPN, where T
n  tpt1nq1u, Sn  tps1nq1u for all n. Notice that
T¯, S¯ are families of distributions of type A; so, given a trace T, compatible with
A we have that a family of term distributions T¯ ÞÑT ξ, where ξ : N Ñ Rr0,1s and
ξpnq  PrpTn,Tq.
At this point, the definition of parametric trace equivalence can be lifted to
parametric term distributions: we say that two parametric term distributions T¯, S¯
are parametrically trace equivalent, if for all trace T such that T¯ ÞÑT ξ, S¯ ÞÑT µ then
there exists a negligible function ε : NÑ Rr0,1s such that for all n P N we have
|ξpnq  µpnq| ¤ εpnq
We write T¯ Tn S¯.
Lemma 6.1 If T¯ Tn S¯ then:
1. If T¯ Ñ T¯1 then T¯1 Tn S¯.
2. If T¯ ñpasspvq T¯1, S¯ñpasspvq S¯1 then T¯ Tn S¯.
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6.3 Full Abstraction
So now, in order to obtain the full abstraction, our goal is to prove that parametric
trace equivalence is a congruence w.r.t. linear contexts, that is to prove that, for all
contexts CrAs : B, if t, s : aStr Ñ A; are parametrically trace equivalent, than also
λy.Crtys Tn λy.Crsys. As we disclosed before the way we prove it is similar to the
previous cases: we work with pairs of the form pC, T¯q and we want to prove that if
T¯ Tn S¯ then also pC, T¯q 
T
n pC, S¯q. Notice that a pair pC, T¯q is actually a parametric
pair, indeed pC, T¯q  tpC,TnqunPN. In order to prove the property of congruence we
will work with parametric pair distributions as P¯  tpCi, T¯iq
piu; given a trace T we
have that P¯ ÞÑT ξ if tpCi, T¯
n
i q
piu ÞÑT ξpnq for all n P N. The definition of parametric
trace equivalence is naturally extended to parametric pair distributions.
The first step towards the congruence proof is to show that if C is an evaluation
context then, given T¯ Tn S¯, such that T¯, S¯ : Str, then we have pC, T¯q 
T
n pC, S¯q; we
prove it by using the following lemmas.
Lemma 6.2 Given a parametric term distribution T¯ : Str Ñ A and a context Cr$
As : B then for all traces T  passpv1q  passpv2q    passpvnq  viewpDq we have:
pC, T¯q ÞÑT ξ ðñ pCv1v2    vn, T¯q ÞÑ
viewpDq ξ
Proof: We work by induction on the length of T. If T  viewpDq then it is obvious.
Suppose now T  passpvq  S  viewpDq, then we have two different cases:
1. If C  λx.C 1 then we have pC, T¯q Ñpasspvq tpC 1tv{xu, T¯q1u.
Similarly pCvS, T¯q Ñ tpC 1tv{xuS, T¯q1u.
But now, by the induction hypothesis we know
pC 1tv{xu, T¯q ÞÑSviewpDq ξ ðñ pC 1tv{xuS, T¯q ÞÑviewpDq ξ
and so the thesis.
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2. Suppose now C  rs then we have prs, T¯q Ñpasspvq tprs, T¯1q1u.
Similarly prsvS, T¯q Ñ tprsS, T¯1q1u.
Then by the induction hypothesis we have:
prs, T¯1q ÞÑSviewpDq ξ ðñ prsS, T¯1q ÞÑviewpDq
and so the thesis.
l
Lemma 6.3 Given two parametric term distributions T¯, S¯ of type string with T¯ Tn S¯
then for all evaluation contexts C such that $ Cr$ Strs : B we have pC, T¯q Tn pC, S¯q.
Proof: Given a trace T  passpv1q  passpv2q    passpvnq  viewpDq if we consider the
distinguisher D1  λx.Crxsv1v2    vn then we have:
pC, T¯q ÞÑT ξ ðñ T¯ ÞÑviewpD
1q ξ
pC, S¯q ÞÑT µ ðñ S¯ ÞÑviewpD
1q µ
l
We can extend this result to parametric pair distributions.
Proposition 1 Given P¯  tpCi, T¯iq
piu, Q¯  tpCi, S¯iq
piu, two parametric pair distri-
butions such that, for all i, Ci are evaluation contexts, T¯i, S¯i : Str and T¯i 
T
n S¯i then
we have P¯ Tn Q¯.
Proof: For all i we know that pCi, T¯iq 
T
n pCi, S¯iq; it means that, given a trace
T, if pCi, T¯iq ÞÑ
T ξi, pCi, S¯iq ÞÑ
T µi there exists a negligible function εi such that
|ξipnq  µipnq| ¤ εipnq.
So we have by definition P¯ ÞÑT ξ 
°
i pi  ξi, Q¯ ÞÑ
T µ 
°
i pi  µi  and then for all
n:
|ξpnq  µpnq| |
¸
i
pi  ξipnq 
¸
i
pi  µipnq|  |
¸
i
pi  pξipnq  µipnqq| ¤
¤
¸
i
pi  |ξipnq  µipnq| ¤
¸
i
pi  εipnq ¤ εpnq
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for a certain negligible function ε. l
The last step is proving that the previous proposition is valid for all context
C, so, before giving the proof we we give, as in the previous cases, a definition of
relatedness between pair distributions.
Definition 29 Given P¯  tpCi, T¯iq
piuiPI , Q¯  tpCi, S¯iq
qiuiPI , we say that they are
parametrically related, and we write P¯OnQ¯ if they can be written as:
P¯ 
¸
jPJ
rj  P¯j   tpCk, T¯kq
rkukPK
Q¯ 
¸
jPJ
rj  Q¯j   tpCk, S¯kq
rkukPK
Where for all j we have P¯j 
T
n Q¯ and for all k we have T¯k 
T
n S¯k.
The idea behind this definition is that we say that two pair distributions P¯, Q¯
are parametrically related if we can split each one into two subdistributions, P¯ 
P¯1   P¯2, Q¯  Q¯1   Q¯2 such that P¯1 and Q¯1 are parametrically trace equivalent and
P¯2, Q¯2 are made by couples where the contexts are the same with the same probabil-
ity and the term distributions are parametrically trace related. Notice that, by this
definition, if pC,Tq, pC, Sq are two couples where C is an evaluation context with the
hole of type Str and T Tn S, then by lemma 6.2 pC,Tq and pC, Sq are parametrically
trace equivalent and so included in P¯1 and Q¯1 respectively. The same happens if C is
a term; indeed we have that for every trace T, Prppt,Tq,Tq  Prpt,Tq  Prppt, Sq,Tq,
so pt,Tq Tn pt, Sq and then pt,Tq and pt, Sq are included in P¯1, Q¯1 respectively.
Our goal is now to prove that parametric relatedness is preserved by internal
and external reduction.
Lemma 6.4 (Internal Parametric Stability) Given P¯, Q¯ such that P¯OnQ¯ then
if P¯V P¯1 then P¯1OnQ¯ or there exists Q¯1 such that Q¯V Q¯1 and P¯1OnQ¯1.
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Proof: As in the previous case we study all the possible reduction of P¯.
If the reduction is made by one of the P¯h V P¯1h with h P J then we have:
P¯V P¯1 
¸
jPJzthu
rj  P¯j   rh  P¯
1
h   tpCk, T¯kq
rkukPK
Q¯ 
¸
jPJzthu
rj  Q¯j   rh  Q¯h   tpCk, S¯kq
rkukPK
but we know P¯1h 
T
n Q¯h and so P¯
1OnQ¯.
Suppose now that the reduction is made by a pair pCh, T¯hq with h P K. As ob-
served before Ch is not an evaluation context of the form $ Cr$ Strs : B, so we can
exclude reductions with observation from the possible cases. Then we have these
possibilities:
• Term distribution reduction.
Suppose T¯h Ñ T¯
1
h. Then we have:
P¯V P¯1 
¸
jPJ
rj  P¯j   tpCk, T¯kq
rkukPKzthu   tpCh, T¯
1
hq
rhu
Q¯ 
¸
jPJ
rj  Q¯j   tpCk, S¯kq
rkukPKzthu   tpCh, S¯hq
rhu
We know T¯1h 
T
n S¯h and so P¯
1OnQ¯.
• Mixed Reduction.
In this case we have pCh, T¯hq Ñ tpC
1
h, T¯
1
hq
1u, so, by the fact that Ch is the same
for P¯ and Q¯ we can say that pCh, S¯hq Ñ tpC
1
h, S¯
1
hq
1u and T¯1h 
T
n S¯
1
h.
So we have:
– If C 1h is a term or an evaluation context and T¯
1
h, S¯
1
h : Str, if we set J
1 
J Y thu, P¯h  tpC
1
h, T¯
1
hq
1u, Q¯h  tpC
1
h, S¯
1
hqu then by lemma 6.3, P¯h 
T
n Q¯h,
so:
P¯V P¯1 
¸
jPJ 1
rj  P¯j   tpCk, T¯kq
rkukPKzthu
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Q¯V Q¯1 
¸
jPJ 1
rj  Q¯j   tpCk, S¯kq
rkukPKzthu
– Otherwise:
P¯V P¯1 
¸
jPJ
rj  P¯j   tpCk, T¯kq
rkukPKzthu   tpC
1
h, T¯
1
hq
rhu
Q¯V Q¯1 
¸
jPJ
rj  Q¯j   tpCk, S¯kq
rkukPKzthu   tpC
1
h, S¯
1
hq
rhu
and so the thesis.
• Reduction without observation.
Suppose now pCh, T¯hq Ñ tpC
1
l , T¯lq
r1lulPL; by definition we have pCh, S¯hq Ñ
tpC 1l , S¯lq
r1lulPL where T¯l  T¯h, S¯l  S¯h for all l P L.
So now:
– If T¯h, S¯h : Str, then we set:
L1  tl P L | C
1
l is an evaluation context or a termu
L2  LzL1
P¯l  tpC
1
l , T¯lq
1u with l P L1
Q¯l  tpC
1
l , S¯lq
1u with l P L1
and we have:
P¯V P¯1 
¸
jPJ
rj  P¯j  
¸
lPL1
rh  r
1
l  P¯l   tpCk, T¯kqukPK   tpC
1
l , T¯lq
rhr
1
lulPL2
Q¯V Q¯1 
¸
jPJ
rj  Q¯j  
¸
lPL1
rh  r
1
l  Q¯l   tpCk, S¯kqukPK   tpC
1
l , S¯lq
rhr
1
lulPL2
– Otherwise we make a similar procedure but we set L1  tl P L | C
1
l is a termu.
so by the fact that for all l P L1, P¯l 
T
n Q¯l and for all l P L2, T¯l 
T
n S¯l, we have
that P¯1OnQ¯1.
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l
Lemma 6.5 (Parametric relatedness, Internally) Given P¯, Q¯ such that P¯OnQ¯
then there exists P¯1, Q¯1 normal, such that if P¯ñ P¯1 and Q¯ñ Q¯1 then P¯1OnQ¯1.
Lemma 6.6 (Parametric Relatedness, Externally) Given P¯, Q¯ : A with P¯OnQ¯,
then for all incomplete traces T, there exist P¯1, Q¯1 normal, such that P¯ñT P¯1, Q¯ñT
Q¯1 and P¯1OnQ¯1.
Proof: We work by induction on the length of the trace.
If T   then by lemma 6.5 we get the thesis.
If T  S  passpvq the we have:
P¯ñS
¸
jPJ
rj  P¯j   tpCk, T¯kq
rkukPK
Q¯ñS
¸
jPJ
rj  Q¯j   tpCk, S¯kq
rkukPK
with P¯j 
T
n Q¯j for all j P J and T¯k 
T
n S¯k for all k P K.
Then we know P¯j Ñ
passpvq P¯1j, Q¯j Ñ
passpvq Q¯1j but P¯
1
j 
T Q¯1j by the properties of 
T
n.
Similarly pCk, T¯kq Ñ
passpvq tpC 1k, T¯
1
kq
1u, pCk, S¯kq Ñ
passpvq tpC 1k, S¯
1
kq
1u with T¯1k 
T
n S¯
1
k for
all k P K.
So we have:
P¯ñSpasspvq P¯1 
¸
jPJ
rj  P¯
1
j   tpC
1
k, T¯
1
kq
rkukPK
Q¯ñSpasspvq Q¯1 
¸
jPJ
rj  Q¯
1
j   tpC
1
k, S¯
1
kq
rkukPK
But P¯1OnQ¯1 so by applying lemma 6.5 we get the thesis. l
Now we are able to prove this result.
Theorem 6.3 Given P¯, Q¯ such that P¯OnQ¯, then P¯ Tn Q¯.
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Proof: We want to show that for every trace T  S  viewpDq we have PrpP¯,Tq 
PrpQ¯,Tq.
By lemma 6.6 we know that there exist P¯1, Q¯1 normal, such that P¯ñS Q¯1, Q¯ñS Q¯1
and P¯1OnQ¯1.
So we have P¯1  tpCi, T¯iq
piu, Q¯1  tpCi, S¯iq
qiu, but both distributions are normal
and of type Str, that means Ci  r$ Strs and T¯i, S¯i normal or Ci  mi.
If P¯1OnQ¯1 then we have P¯1  P¯11 P¯12 and Q¯1  Q¯11 Q¯12, but all the contexts are strings
or evaluation contexts with the hole of type Str, so we can say that P¯12  Q¯
1
2  H,
that means P¯1  P¯11 
T
n Q¯
1
1  Q¯
1. l
Corollary 6.1 Parametrically trace equivalence is a congruence w.r.t. linear con-
text.
Proof: Given t, s : aStrÑ A, such that t Tn s, we want to show that for all context
Cr$ As : B then λy.Crtys Tn λy.Crsys.
We set T¯  tTnunPN, S¯  tS
nunPN, with T
n  tpt1nq1u, Sn  tps1nq1u, and P¯ 
tpC, T¯q1u, Q¯  tpC, S¯q1u, with Pn  tpC,Tnq1u,Qn  tpC, Snq1u.
It is obvious P¯OnQ¯, so for every trace T such that P¯ ÞÑT ξ, Q¯ ÞÑT µ there exists a
negligible function ε such that for all n P N we have |ξpnq  µpnq| ¤ εpnq.
So we get:
|Prpλy.Crtys, passp1nq  Tq  Prpλy.Crsys, passp1nq  Tq| 
 |PrpCrt1ns,Tq  PrpCrs1ns,Tq|  |ξpnq  µpnq| ¤
¤ εpnq
and so the thesis. l
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Chapter 7
Applications
In this chapter we will give some applications of our method to real cryptographic
situations. As we talked in the introduction, in order to analyze a cryptographic
primitive or a protocol, we need to use a standard approach based on four points:
we need to define the security property we want to prove, we need to define a
realistic model of a potential adversary, then we need to present a formalization of
the cryptographic primitive or protocol under study and finally we need to prove
that the security property reduces to a particular assumption.
7.1 A Simple Encryption Scheme
The first case we are going to analyze is a cryptographic primitive for the encryption
of a message; first of all we need to define the security property we want to prove,
that is secrecy. We formalize this property by saying that the encryptions of two
different messages are indistinguishable.
This is a common assumption in cryptography and it is called IND-CPA (Indis-
tinguishability against Chosen-Plaintext Attack), indeed if an adversary is not able
to distinguish between the encryption of two different messages, that are chosen
by himself, it means that he can’t take any information of the plaintext from the
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cyphertext and so secrecy is certain. The second step is the definition of a real-
istic model of the adversary, so we consider all the probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm A, that are encoded in our system by linear context C.
Now, we introduce the cryptographic system under study. Consider, as an ex-
ample, the two terms
t  λn.pλk.λx.λy.ENCpx nq kqpGEN nq s  λn.pλk.λx.λy.ENCpy nq kqpGEN nq
where ENC is meant to be an encryption function, GEN is a function generating a
random key and x, y are two deterministic function that return a string whose length
depends on the security parameter. We can prove that the two terms are paramet-
rically context equivalent if ENC is the cryptoscheme induced by a pseudorandom
generator. We propose:
ENC  λm.λk.m` pG kq : aStrÑ bStrÑ Str
where G : StrÑ Str is a pseudorandom generator.
Now, in order to prove our security property, that is that t and s are indistin-
guishable, we need to reduce to a particular assumption. We will prove that the
indistinguishability between t, s can be reduced to the indistinguishability between
the pseudorandom generator G and a real random generator R. Going into detail
we consider:
PRG : λn.pλk.G kqpGEN nq RND : λn.pλk.R kqpGEN nq
where PRG is a pseudorandom generator, RND a random generator.
We will show that if we are able to distinguish between t and s then we are able to
distinguish between PRG and RND; but, by the fact that a pseudorandom generator
and a random generator are indistinguishable by definition, we get a contradiction
and so it can’t be possible to distinguish between t and s.
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Suppose t, s aren’t indistinguishable; then there exists a trace T  passpfq 
passpgq  viewpDq, with f, g : aStrÑ Str, such that:
|Prpt, passp1nq  Tq  Prps, passp1nq  Tq| ¡ εpnq
for all ε negligible function.
If GEN 1n Ñ tpkqpkukPSpG 1nq we have:
tñpassp1
nqpasspfqpasspgq tpf1n ` pG kqpkukPSpG 1nq
sñpassp1
nqpasspfqpasspgq tpg1n ` pG kqqpkukPSpG 1nq
and then we have:
εpnq ¤| Prpt, passp1nq  Tq  Prps, passp1nq  Tq| 
|
¸
kPSpGEN 1nq
pk  JD pf1n ` pG kqqKpq  ¸
kPSpGEN 1nq
pk  JD pg1n ` pG kqqKpq| 
|ξpnq  µpnq|
for all ε : NÑ R negligible functions.
Given a random generator R, we can say by the properties of one-time-pad that
JDpf1n ` pR kqKpq  JDpg1n ` pR kqqKpq  νpnq
So we have that for all n:
εpnq   |ξpnq  µpnq|  |ξpnq  νpnq   νpnq  µpnq| ¤ |ξpnq  νpnq|   |νpnq  µpnq|
This means that at least one between |ξpnq  νpnq| and |νpnq  µpnq| is more than
negligible. Now, we call GEN1 : aStrÑ Str the inverse function of GEN, that given
a string k returns the security parameter string 1n; this way we can build
Df  λz.D p pfpGEN
1zqq ` z q Dg  λz.D p pgpGEN
1zqq ` z q
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At this point, we consider:
PrpPRG, passp1nq  viewpDfqq 
¸
kPSpGEN 1nq
pk  JDfpG kqKpq 

¸
kPSpGEN 1nq
pk  JDpf1n ` pG kqKpq 
ξpnq
PrpRND, passp1nq  viewpDfqq 
¸
kPSpGEN 1nq
pk  JDfpR kqKpq 

¸
kPSpGEN 1nq
pk  JDpf1n ` pR kqKpq 
 νpnq
and we have:
| PrpPRG, passp1nq  viewpDfqq  PrpRND, passp1
nq  viewpDfqq |  | ξpnq  νpnq |
Funrthermore:
PrpPRG, passp1nq  viewpDgqq 
¸
kPSpGEN 1nq
pk  JDgpG kqKpq 

¸
kPSpGEN 1nq
pk  JDpg1n ` pG kqKpq 
 µpnq
PrpRND, passp1nq  viewpDgqq 
¸
kPSpGEN 1nq
pk  JDgpR kqKpq 

¸
kPSpGEN 1nq
pk  JDpg1n ` pR kqKpq 
 νpnq
and we have:
| PrpPRG, passp1nq  viewpDgqq  PrpRND, passp1
nq  viewpDgqq |  | µpnq  νpnq |
so we have that at least one trace between passp1nq  viewpDfq and passp1
nq  viewpDgq
separates PRG and RND and this is a contradiction.
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7.2 El-Gamal Encryption Scheme
We propose now another example to test our approach: the El-Gamal Encryption
Scheme.
In order to describe the El-Gamal encryption scheme we have to introduce some
different functions that are necessary to explain how the system works; we won’t give
in details the terms that represent these functions, but we know by the properties
of RSLR that they can be easily implemented.
• The first function we introduce is zrpnq; this function takes in input the se-
curity parameter n and returns a random string lesser or equal than n (every
string can be seen as the binary representation of an integer). This function
is necessary because we will work with a finite cyclic group whose cardinality
can be different from a power of 2.
• The second function is the concatenation of bitstrings that we indicate with
; this function takes in input two strings and return a string that is the
concatenation of the two received in input. We will use the notation m  n for
 m n.
• The last two function are pi1, pi2: these functions take in input a string m and
the security parameter n and returns the string received in input without the
first (or the last in the case of pi2) rlog2 ns bit of the string. For example we
have pi1pm  nq Ñ n and pi2pm  nq Ñ m
• Finally we have to suppose that we have the possibility to encode a function
that evaluates the exponential, we will write gm for g raise to the power m and
a function that encodes multiplication ,we will write g1  g2 for g1 times g2.
Now we are able to introduce the El-Gamal encryption scheme. Given a cyclic group
G of order n and generator g the El-Gamal encryption scheme is defined by the triple
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pGEN,ENC,DECq, where:
GEN λn.pλx.gx  xqpzr nq
ENC λn.λm.λpk.pλy.pgy  pky mnqqpzr nq
DEC λn.λc.λsk.ppi1pcq  pi2pcq
skq
where m : aStrÑ Str is a varaible for a function that returns a bitstring distribution
depending on the security parameter.
We can consider a cyphertext obtained by the El-Gamal cryptosystem as:
c  λn.λm.pλpk.λy.ppk  gy  pky mnqqppi2GENpnqqpzrpnqq
that is the concatenation of the public key pk with gy and with the encryption of
the message pky m. In order to ensure the security of the cryptosystem we want
to prove that a cyphertext buildt by this system is indistinguishable from a string
where the final part (i.e. the encryption of the message) is chosen randomly, that
is:
rm  λn.λm.pλpk.λy.λz.ppk  gy  gzqqppi2GENpnqqpzrpnqqpzrpnqq
The security proof of the El-Gamal encryption system is based on the DDH as-
sumpion: it says that an adversary in unable to distinguish between pgx, gy, gxyq and
pgx, gy, gzq, with x, y, z chosen randomly. We convert this assumption in our language
by saying that, if:
DDH1 λn.pλx.λy.g
x  gy  gxyqpzrpnqqpzrpnqq
DDH2 λn.pλx.λy.λ.z.g
x  gy  gzqpzrpnqqpzrpnqqpzrpnqq
then DDH1  DDH2.
Now, in order to prove that c Tn rm we will show that if this is not true then
we will be able to distinguish between DDH1 and DDH2. So, suppose there exists T
such that:
|Prpc, passpnq  Tq  Prprm, passpnq  Tq| ¡ εpnq
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for all ε negligible functions.
We have T  passpfq  viewpDq and, if fn Ñ tpgmqpmumPSpfnq then:
cñpasspnqpasspfqtpgx  gy  gxy mq
1
n2
pmux,yPG,gmPSpfnq
rmñpasspnqpasspfqtpgx  gy  gzq
1
n3 ux,y,zPG
that means:
Prpc, passpnq  Tq 
¸
x,yPG,gmPSpfnq
1
n2
 pm  JDpgx  gy  gxy mqKpq  ξpnq
Prprm, passpnq  Tq 
¸
x,y,zPG
1
n3
 JDpgx  gy  gzqKpq  µpnq
So if we consider T1  viewpD1q with:
D1  λw.Dpppi2wq  ppi1pppi1wqq  fpGEN
1wqqq
we have:
DDH1 ñ
passpnqtpgx  gy  gxyq
1
n2 ux,yPG
DDH2 ñ
passpnqtpgx  gy  gzq
1
n3 ux,y,zPG
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and so:
PrpDDH1, passpnq  T
1q 
¸
x,yPG
1
n2
 JD1pgx  gy  gxyqKpq 

¸
x,yPG,gmPSpfnq
1
n2
 pm  JDpgx  gy  gxy mqKpq  ξpnq
PrpDDH2, passpnq  T
1q 
¸
x,y,zPG
1
n3
 JD1pgx  gy  gzqKpq 

¸
x,yPG
1
n2

¸
zPG,gmPSpfnq
1
n
 pm  JDpgx  gy  gz mqKpq 

¸
x,y,zPG
1
n3

¸
gmPSpfnq
pm  JDpgx  gy  gzqKpq 

¸
x,y,zPG
1
n3
 JDpgx  gy  gzqKpq  µpnq
So we have :
|PrpDDH1, passpnq  T
1q  PrpDDH2, passpnq  Tq|  |ξpnq  µpnq| ¡ εpnq
for all ε negligible and so a contradiction.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
In this thesis we started from an overview of the actual scenario in the field of
cryptographic proofs; as we said cryptographic proofs are becoming more and more
complex so it is very difficult to give it by hand, furthermore, by this reason, it is
necessary to give the possibility to analyze the proof itself.
In order to help the cryptographer community, there have been developed several
approaches: we presented three of them based on formal methods, automated tools
and process calculi. As we have seen, the game-based proof is one of the most
used standard to give a cryptographic proof. A key point in such proofs are game
transitions, that needs to be justified; these transitions are often justified by saying
that the two games are computationally indistinguishable and this is the key point
of this thesis. We focus our attention on computational indistinguishability, and we
give a characterization of CI by using traces instead of arbitrary algorithms.
We started by studying notions of equivalences and metrics in a language for
higher order probabilistic polynomial time computation, that is very useful to model
primitives and adversaries. More specifically, we have shown that the discriminating
power of linear contexts can be captured by traces, both when equivalences and
metrics are considered. Moreover, we gave evidence on how applicative bisimilarity
is a sound, but not fully abstract, methodology for context equivalence.
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We believe, however, that the main contribution of this work is the new light
it sheds on the relations between computational indistinguishability, linear contexts
and traces. In particular, this approach, which is implicitly used in the literature on
the subject [38, 37], is shown to have some limitations, but also to suggest a notion
of higher-order indistinguishability which could possibly be an object of study in
itself.
Finally we gave concrete cryptographic examples in which we proved the secrecy
of an encryption induced by a pseudorandom generator, by using the parametric
trace equivalence we defined; the result we offer is a formal reduction proof in which
each step is mathematically justified without external assumptions.
For what concerns real cryptographic applications, the careful reader should have
spotted some limitations to the method we propose. One of the doubt that arises is
about the linearity of the contexts; roughly speaking, this constraint doesn’t permit
to an adversary to copy the term he is testing. Endowing the observer with this
capability would allow him to pass different arguments to the same term and observe
multiple outputs; by this way it would be impossible for a simple trace to catch the
differences seen by the observer. This faculty is a common standard in cryptography,
where an adversary is allowed to do multiple (polynomially bounded) queries to an
oracle that implements a cryptographic primitive.
Another limitation can be found in the calculus itself, that doesn’t admit pairs
and projections. As seen in the El-Gamal example, we can overcome this restriction
in the case of terms of base type Str by postulating the existence of functions that
concatenate and separate bitstrings, but we are not able to manage the case of pairs
where terms are of higher order type.
A possible solution for both problems is the definition of a different framework,
a framework in which we don’t consider single terms but we rather work on tuples
of indexed terms rt11, ..., t
n
ns [18]. In this framework traces are modeled so that they
take into account the index of the term we want to perform the action, for instance
if we want to pass a value v to the j-th term λx.tj the action will be in the form
passpj, vq; the observation can be performed only of all the elements of the tuple are
strings and it is made on the whole tuple, not on single values. Another feature of
this framework is the management of pairs by giving the possibility to split them
into new tuples; suppose to have a tuple of the form r..., xs1, s2y
j, ..s, then we insert
a new action unfold that split the pair into two different terms such that:
r..., xs1, s2y
j, ..s Ñunfold
j
r..., sj1, s
k
2, ..s
so that we have a new tuple and we are able to pass argument to both terms of the
pair.
We conclude with a final consideration: Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 6.2 state
that two terms t, s : aStr Ñ Str are computational indistinguishability if and only
if they are parametrically trace equivalent, but there is a question that naturally
becomes apparent: what happens if the type of the terms is a generic aStr Ñ A
with A of higher order type? Actually, we don’t have a definition of higher order
computational indistinguishability present in literature (at any rate, we don’t have
a formal and precise one), so a comparison with parametric context equivalence is
difficult.
Furthermore, it seems that linear contexts do not capture equivalence as tradi-
tionally employed in cryptography already when A is a first-order type bStr Ñ Str.
The simplest example can be found in the definition of pseudo-randomness which
can be spelled out for functions, giving rise to the concept of pseudorandom func-
tions [29]. Formally, a function F : t0, 1u Ñ t0, 1u Ñ t0, 1u is said to be a
pseudorandom function iff F psq is a function which is indistinguishable from a ran-
dom function from t0, 1un to t0, 1un whenever s is drawn at random from n-bit
strings. Indistinguishability, again, is defined in terms of PPT algorithms having
oracle access to F psq. Having access to an oracle for a function is of course different
than having linear access to it. Indeed, building a linear pseudorandom function
is very easy: Gpsq is defined to be the function which returns s independently on
the value of its input. G is of course not pseudorandom in the classical sense, since
testing the function multiple times a distinguisher immediately sees the difference
with a truly random function. On the other hand, if s is a term that returns n bits
drawn at random, the RSLR term tGs that implements the function G above can
be proved trace equivalent to a term r that returns a truly random function from
nbitstrings to nbitstrings.
However, investigating into higher-order computational indistinguishability is
out of the scope of this thesis, but we believe that these argumentations could be a
first step towards a formal analysis of this theme.
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